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INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS AND THE NEW
WORLD COURT ORDER
Julian G. Ku*
Abstract: In Medellin v. Dretke, the U.S. Supreme Court squarely considered the
domestic judicial enforceability of a judgment by the International Court of Justice for the
first time. Although the Court ultimately dismissed the case due to President George W.
Bush's intervention, the issue that won the Court's attention-the domestic legal status of
international tribunal judgments-will almost certainly return to the Court in the near future.
When it does, the Court will be faced with calls from leading scholars to enforce the
judgments of international courts and tribunals as part of a "new world court order,"
characterized by cooperation between international and domestic courts. This Article takes
issue with that stream of scholarship by laying out the first comprehensive constitutional
critique of judicial enforcement of international tribunal judgments. U.S. constitutional
doctrine and practice with respect to the enforcement of international law obligations
confirms that domestic courts have no independent authority to implement international
tribunal judgments. Indeed, independent judicial enforcement of international tribunal
judgments of the kind sought by the petitioners in Medellin would result in potentially
excessive delegations of the U.S. foreign affairs power. To avoid this constitutional problem,
this Article recommends that courts treat all such international tribunal judgments as nonself-executing absent a clear statement in the treaty that judicial enforcement is permitted.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2004, the United States Supreme Court granted a
petition for certiorari to consider whether a judgment of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) is binding on U.S. courts.1 In Medellin v. Dretke,2
a Mexican national facing execution by the State of Texas sued to
enforce the ICJ's ruling that U.S. courts must reconsider his claim for
relief under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR).3
The Court thus agreed to consider the important but unsettled question
of an international tribunal judgment's status within U.S. law. Although
the U.S. has participated in forms of international adjudication from its
earliest history,4 the Supreme Court had never before directly considered
the domestic legal significance of judgments issued by any international
tribunal.
The question of the domestic enforceability of international tribunal
judgments, however, remains unsettled. The Court dismissed the case
without deciding the issues it had planned to consider due in large part to
President George W. Bush's intervention.5 At least four members of the
Court appear ready to grant certiorari in a future case that raises the

1. Medellin v. Dretke (Medellin I1), - U.S. _ (Dec. 10, 2004), 125 S. Ct. 686, 686 (2004),
cert. dismissed,__ U.S.__ (May 23, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005) (per curiam).
2. Medellin v. Dretke (Medellin 11), -

U.S. -

(May 23, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005) (per

curiam).
3. Id. at 2089.
4. See, e.g., Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. VI, Nov. 19, 1794, 8
Stat. 116 (appointing five commissioners who were empowered to settle claims arising out of the
U.S. Revolutionary War).
5. Medellin I1, 125 S. Ct. at 2090 (dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
During the briefing for the case, President Bush released a memorandum determining that the
United States would comply with the ICJ's decision through state court proceedings. See id. (citing
Brief for United States as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at app. 2, Medellin 111, 125 S. Ct.
2088 (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 504490 (George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General
(Feb. 28, 2005))). This intervention convinced five members of the Court to remand the case to
Texas courts rather than reach a final decision on the merits. Id. at 2092.
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6

Moreover, the issue of the domestic enforceability of an international
court's judgment will not go away. Litigants are increasingly asking
U.S. courts to enforce judgments by international tribunals and courts.
Not only has the U.S. government been the subject of three adverse
judgments issued by the ICJ in the last eight years,7 but the U.S. has also

suffered a number of adverse judgments before the dispute resolution
panels of the World Trade Organization 8 and the North American Free
Trade Agreement. 9 Moreover, the U.S. is party to hundreds of treaties

and executive agreements binding it to dispute resolution by a variety of
international tribunals and courts.' 0 Increasingly, litigants before
international tribunals will, like Jos6 Medellin, seek to enforce their

judgments directly in U.S. courts.
Many, if not most, legal scholars have welcomed the rise of
international tribunals and the increasing frequency and importance of
their interaction with domestic courts." Indeed, leading scholars have

theorized that interaction between international tribunals and domestic
courts forms a central component of an international order characterized
by respect for and submission to international law and international
institutions.12

6. See id. at 2093 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2096 (O'Connor, J., joined
by Stevens, Souter, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
7. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31); LaGrand Case
(F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v.
U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Provisional Measures Order of Apr. 9).
8. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States--Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on
Corrosion-ResistantCarbon Steel Flat Productsfrom Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2003)
(finding U.S. duties on steel in violation of World Trade Organization (WTO) and General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) agreements); Appellate Body Report, United States-Tax
Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations'--Recourseto Article 21.5 of the DSU by the
European Communities, WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002) (finding U.S. tax code provisions on
foreign sales corporations to be in violation of WTO and GATT agreements); Panel Report, United
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DSF8/R, WT/DS58/R,
(May 15, 1998) (finding legislation prohibiting importation of shrimp from countries using
technology that endangers sea turtles to be in violation of WTO and GATT agreements).
9. See, e.g., In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Final Affirmative
Countervailing Duty Determination, USA-CDA-2002-1904-03 (Dec. 1, 2004) (finding U.S. duties
on Canadian softwood lumber to be in violation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)).
10. See infra Part l.B.
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. The two leading proponents of this approach are Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter of the Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and Dean Harold Hongju
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The briefing before the Supreme Court in Medellin reflected
arguments advanced by these scholars. The petitioner and various amici
asked the Court to treat ICJ interpretations of U.S. treaty obligations as
judgments binding on all domestic U.S. courts, including the U.S.
Supreme Court. 3 In this way, the Medellin case represents1 4 an important
first step in bringing a "new world court order" to the U.S.
This Article argues that permitting U.S. courts to give domestic effect
to international tribunal judgments would create serious difficulties as a
matter of U.S. constitutional law. While some have suggested that
enforcement of international tribunal judgments threatens the federal
courts' judicial power under Article III of the U.S. Constitution,1 5 1 offer
a different constitutional critique. In my view, the power to enforce
international tribunal judgments is properly understood to fall within the
foreign affairs powers granted to Congress and the President under
Article I and Article II. The power is not granted to the federal courts
pursuant to Article III. As such, Congress and the President are the only
institutions constitutionally authorized to determine how or whether to
implement an international tribunal judgment as a matter of domestic
law.
Retaining political branch control over compliance with international
tribunal judgments is best understood as a mechanism for avoiding an

Koh of the Yale Law School. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65-100
(2004) [hereinafter A NEW WORLD ORDER]; Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2646 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY

AGREEMENTS (1995) and THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS (1995)). A new generation of scholars has also expanded this approach in recent
important articles. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogueand Decree: InternationalReview
of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2086-123 (2004); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an
InternationalJudicialSystem, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 460-77 (2003).
13. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Government of the United Mexican States in Support of
Petitioner Jose Ernesto Medellin at 4, Medellin III, _ U.S. _ (May 23, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 2088
(2005) (per curiam) (No. 04-5928), 2004 WL 2381136; Brief of Foreign Sovereigns as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner Jose Ernesto Medellin at 18, Medellin III, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 045928), 2005 WL 176450; Brief of International Law Experts and Former Diplomats as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 16-17, Medellin III, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928), 2004 WL
2381135.
14. See infra Part II. I use the phrase "new world court order" to describe the intersection of two
phenomena: the growth and importance of international tribunals and the effort to enforce the
judgments of international tribunals in domestic courts.
15. See, e.g., A. Mark Weisburd, InternationalCourts and American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L.
877, 893-901 (2000) (arguing that international review of U.S. court judgments may violate Article
III of the U.S. Constitution's allocation ofjudicial power to federal courts).
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impermissible delegation of the U.S. foreign affairs power to
international tribunals. This does not mean that the Constitution
prohibits international tribunals from interpreting U.S. obligations under
international law. Rather; my argument is that such international tribunal
judgments should not be enforced as a matter of U.S. domestic law
without clear authorization by either the President or Congress.
To be sure, even in the domestic sphere, the "nondelegation" doctrine
is better known for its underenforcement than as a serious constitutional
constraint. The nondelegation doctrine has remained so dormant that
16
leading scholars have recently attempted to bury it once and for all.
the
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has continued to avoid applying
17
agencies.
administrative
to
delegations
legislative
to
doctrine
This Article maintains that, at least with respect to U.S. enforcement
of international tribunal judgments, applying the nondelegation doctrine
is the best way to ensure the constitutionality of U.S. participation in
international adjudication. 18 Unlike delegations to domestic institutions,
international delegations involve transfers of legal authority to
international institutions where the politically accountable branches of
the federal government have fewer mechanisms of control. This
understanding of delegation limitations on the foreign affairs power is
consistent with U.S. practice.
While the U.S. is party to hundreds of international agreements
committing it to binding dispute resolution before international tribunals,
many of those agreements are enforced by the political branches, e.g.,
either Congress or the President.1 9 The pattern of U.S. practice has relied
heavily on the President, and to a lesser extent Congress and the states,
to determine how or whether to comply with adverse international
tribunal judgments. Absent executive order or specific authorization by
Congress, none of these agreements authorize domestic courts to enforce
international tribunal judgments.
This pattern of practice suggests that the most likely practical
manifestation of the nondelegation doctrine in the international context
will be as a rule of treaty interpretation. Although the Supreme Court has
not struck down a federal statute under the nondelegation doctrine for

16. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1721, 1733-36, 1743-54 (2002).
17. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 476 (2001).
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part II.B.

International Delegations
over seventy years, 220 the modem Court continues to employ the
nondelegation doctrine as a "super-strong clear statement rule" in
statutory interpretation. 2' In other words, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the nondelegation doctrine to require "clear statements" in
federal statutes before interpreting 2those
statutes to delegate legislative
2
authority to administrative agencies.
The same "super-strong clear statement" approach can be employed
by domestic courts to limit delegations of the U.S. government's foreign
affairs power to international tribunals. 23 Before a U.S. court gives an
international tribunal's interpretation of a treaty obligation selfexecuting domestic effect, that court should identify a clear statement in
the treaty that the tribunal's interpretations are intended to have such
self-executing domestic effect in the U.S. Such a clear statement
requiring judicial enforcement can be expressly provided by the treaty.24
Alternatively, a clear statement might be found in congressional
legislation implementing the treaty, or in an executive order made by the
President.25
Applying the nondelegation doctrine does not preclude U.S.
compliance with international tribunal judgments. Rather, it sharply
limits, but does not eliminate, the independent role of domestic courts in

20. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541 (1935) (finding that a
federal program was an unconstitutional delegation of federal power).
21. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement
Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992).
22. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645 (1980)
(noting that without a "clear mandate" in the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), it was
unreasonable to assume that Congress unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power to the
Secretary of OSHA). The Court does not invoke a "clear statement" rule but its approach was later
described by Professors Eskridge and Frickey as a clear statement requirement. See Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 2 1.
23. See Curtis A. Bradley, InternationalDelegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-SelfExecution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1587-95 (2003). This Article builds on Professor Bradley's
"non-self-executing" approach to international delegations and offers a comprehensive doctrinal and
functional basis for this approach to treaty interpretation.
24. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Annex VI, art. 39, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 570 [hereinafter UNCLOS] ("[Diecisions of the [Seabed Disputes] Chamber
shall be enforceable in the territories of the States Parties in the same manner as judgments or orders
of the highest court of the State Party in whose territory the enforcement is sought.").
25. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a) (2000) ("An award of an arbitral tribunal rendered pursuant to
chapter IV of the [International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)] convention
shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United States. The pecuniary obligations imposed by
such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the award
were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States.").
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deciding how and whether to comply with international tribunal
judgments. Under this approach, the responsibility for determining how
and whether to comply with international tribunal judgments remains
with the political branches of the U.S. government. This allocation of
authority is fully consistent with the structure of foreign affairs powers
in the Constitution and historical U.S. practice.
Given the dormancy of the modern nondelegation doctrine, this result
is hardly required. For this reason, I will offer three functional
justifications for requiring a super-strong clear statement before
recognizing treaty delegations to international tribunals. First, a superstrong clear statement rule would operate as an accountability-forcing
rule that would require the U.S. political branches to take responsibility
for complying with international tribunal judgments. 26 Second, a superstrong clear statement rule would bolster the domestic political
legitimacy of international tribunal judgments. International tribunals,
like other international organizations, are likely to suffer from a
"legitimacy" deficit when their decisions encroach upon matters
previously governed purely by domestic law and institutions.27 Third, a
super-strong clear statement rule would also favor allocation of authority
to the institutions most competent in assessing whether and how to
comply with that international tribunal judgment.2 8
Part I reviews the U.S. Supreme Court's first consideration of judicial
enforcement of international tribunal judgments in the recently
dismissed case of Medellin. Part II places Medellin in a broader context
by describing the arrival of a "new world court order" characterized by a
proliferation of international tribunals whose judgments may be enforced
by domestic courts. Part III argues that the power to comply with
international tribunal judgments is best understood as part of the foreign
affairs power of the U.S. government held by either the President or
Congress. Part IV explains that giving domestic effect to an international
tribunal judgment constitutes a potentially unconstitutional delegation of
the foreign affairs power. Part V then fleshes out how courts might use
the nondelegation doctrine to require treaties or other international
agreements to contain a super-strong clear statement authorizing
domestic judicial enforceability. Part V also offers functional
justifications for using the nondelegation doctrine to police the U.S.

26. See infra Part V.D. I.
27. See infra Part V.D.2.
28. See infra Part V.D.3.
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relationship with international tribunals.
I.

MEDELLIN V DRETKE: THE DOMESTIC ENFORCEABILITY
OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL JUDGMENTS

In Medellin, the Supreme Court confronted the judicial enforceability
of an international tribunal judgment for the first time. In this Part, I first
review the international legal background of the case and the cases that
led to it. Then I analyze the complex web of constitutional and
international law issues that spurred the Court to grant certiorari. Finally,
I consider the issues left unresolved by the President's intervention and
the Supreme Court's dismissal of the case. As this discussion reveals,
the status of international tribunal judgments is hotly contested by
leading scholars and advocates, as well as within the Court itself.
A.

The ICJ VCCR Litigation

Since 1998, the U.S. has been the subject of three separate lawsuits at
the ICJ alleging U.S. violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (VCCR). 29 The VCCR was ratified by the U.S. in 1969.3o The
VCCR represents the culmination of years of negotiation between most
of the world's countries about the rights and obligations of consular
officials. 3' Prior to acceptance of the VCCR by most of the world's
countries in the 1960s, the rights and duties of consuls were governed by
a combination of customary international law and bilateral agreements.32
The VCCR contains two provisions regarding communication and
contact between consulates and nationals of foreign states. First,
paragraph 1 of article 36 creates new rights for consular officials to be
informed when a foreign national is arrested.33 This right, and the related
obligation of the host government to notify the foreign national of the
consular right, was not broadly recognized in customary international
law prior to the adoption of the VCCR.34 Second, paragraph 2 of article
29. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261

[hereinafter VCCR].
30. Id.
31. See LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 23-26 (2d ed. 1991).

32. Id. at 17-18.
33. VCCR, supra note 29, art. 36(l)(b).
34. See id.; see also LEE, supra note 31, at 107 & n.4. Article 36 provides in full:
Communication and contact with nationals of the sending State
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:1, 2006

36 obliges states to ensure their domestic laws conform to these
requirements.3 5 Article 36(2) provides that:
The rights [to receive notification] .. . shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State,
subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and
regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes
for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.36
This provision became the central focus of litigation against the U.S. in
the ICJ.
Additionally, while disputes over consular relations had been
traditionally handled via bilateral diplomacy, the VCCR offered stateparties an international dispute resolution mechanism.37 Pursuant to the
Optional Protocol to the VCCR (Optional Protocol), "[d]isputes arising
out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice ....
This provision gives the ICJ jurisdiction to resolve disputes between
states under the VCCR, including the U.S., 3 9 which ratified the Optional
Protocol at the same time that it ratified the VCCR.
sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to
have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to
communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay,
inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that
State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other
manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison,
custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said
authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison,
custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal
representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in
prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular
officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or
detention if he expressly opposes such action.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph I of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the
laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws
and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights
accorded under this Article are intended.
VCCR, supra note 29, art. 36.
35. See VCCR, supra note 29, art. 36(2).
36. Id.
37. See id., Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional
Protocol), art. I.
38. Id.
39. Id.

International Delegations
The VCCR lay dormant for a decade after its ratification. 40 The
federal government took measures to implement the treaty with respect
to its immigration regulations,41 but there was no additional legislation at
either the federal or state level. In the mid-1990s, however, the VCCR's
role in U.S. law took a sharp turn when the government of Paraguay
filed a complaint in federal district court seeking to vindicate its rights
under the treaty.4 2 Since 1998, the U.S. has been the defendant in three
separate lawsuits at the ICJ alleging U.S. violations of the VCCR.
1.

The Breard Case

4 3 Paraguay
In Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Breard),
alleged that the U.S. had violated article 36 of the VCCR by failing to
notify Paraguay's consulate of a Paraguayan national's arrest,
conviction, and sentence of capital punishment.4 4 After U.S. courts
rejected its claims,4 5 Paraguay invoked the Optional Protocol and
applied to the ICJ for a judgment against the U.S. for violating the
VCCR.4 6 In particular, Paraguay sought a judgment blocking the
impending execution of one of its nationals, Angel Breard, by the State
of Virginia. 47 The ICJ did not rule on the question of whether the VCCR
required suspension of the execution, but it did issue a provisional
measures order suspending the execution so that the ICJ could consider
the arguments on the merits.48 Both Paraguay and Breard returned to

40. The first case to consider article 36 of the VCCR occurred in 1979 in the context of
immigration service regulations. See United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 531 n.6 (9th
Cir. 1979).
41. See Apprehension, Custody, and Detention, 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2005). Another example of
the change in federal law appeared in U.S. Department of Justice arrest procedures, which state that
an officer arresting a foreign national must inform him of his right to notify his consul. See
Notification of Consular Officers Upon the Arrest of Foreign Nationals, 28 C.F.R. § 50.5(a)(1)

(2005).
42. See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1271-72 (E.D. Va. 1996) (reviewing
complaint).
43. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Provisional
Measures Order of Apr. 9).
44. Id. at 249.
45. Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1271.
46. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 249-50
(Provisional Measures Order of Apr. 9).
47. Id. at 251-52.
48. Id. at 258; see William J. Aceves, International Decisions: Application of the Vienna
Convention on ConsularRelations (Paraguayv. United States), 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 517, 518 (1998).
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U.S. courts and, citing the ICJ order, asked the U.S. Supreme Court to
suspend Breard's execution.4 9
In a hurried per curiam opinion, 50 the Court refused to suspend the
execution.5' It noted that the ICJ's provisional measures order was
probably not a binding obligation under international law. 52 The Court
also ruled that even if the Vienna Convention provided judicially
enforceable relief for violations of its notification provisions, such relief
was precluded by a 1996 federal statute limiting the jurisdiction of
federal courts to give such relief in habeas proceedings.5 3 Specifically,
the Court held that the federal statute prevented federal courts from
taking jurisdiction over claims that would have been "procedurally
defaulted" under state law because defendants had failed to raise such
claims in their original trial and appeal.54 In other words, the Court held
that the federal statute denied jurisdiction to federal courts over Breard's
claim because Breard had failed to raise his VCCR claim at his state
court trial and appeal.
At the same time that the U.S. Supreme Court refused to intervene,
the U.S. Secretary of State sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia
asking him to consider the ICJ order when determining whether to allow
the Breard execution to go forward. 55 The Governor duly announced that
he had considered the order but that he was not bound by it. 56 Breard
was then executed.5 7 Paraguay and the U.S. subsequently reached a
diplomatic settlement resulting in Paraguay's termination of its case
before the ICJ reached final judgment.58 The ICJ did not get an
49. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373-75 (1998) (per curiam) (discussing the procedural
history and separate claims raised by Angel Breard and the Republic of Paraguay).
50. See id. at 372-74. The opinion was issued on April 14, eleven days after Paraguay's
application, five days after the ICJ's order, and hours before Breard's scheduled execution.
51. Id. at 378-79.
52. Id. at 375 (noting that procedural rules of the forum state govern a treaty's implementation
absent a clear statement to the contrary).
53. Id. at 376-77 (noting that Breard's failure to comply with the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.), barred his habeas claim).
54. Id. at 375-77.
55. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 51, app. F (Letter from Madeline K.
Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, to James Gilmore, Governor of Virginia (Apr. 13, 1998)), Breard
v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 97-8214 (A-732)).
56. Asha Rangappa, The Power to Pardon, the Power to Gain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2001, at A13.
57. Id.

58. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J.
99 (Nov. 10). For a detailed overview of the Breard case, see Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our
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opportunity to rule on the merits of the foreign nationals' VCCR claims
until nearly two years later when Germany brought an ICJ application
nearly identical to Paraguay's.
2.

The LaGrand Case

In LaGrand Case,59 Germany sought to suspend the execution of
Walter LaGrand, a German national who had been sentenced to death by
the State of Arizona. Like Paraguay, Germany won a provisional
measures order from the ICJ ordering the suspension of the execution
pending the ICJ's consideration of the merits, 60 but neither Arizona nor
the U.S. Supreme Court treated this order as binding. 6 1 LaGrand was
then executed.6 2 Unlike Paraguay, Germany continued to litigate the case
in the ICJ and, after a year, brought the U.S. to a full scale hearing on the
merits.63
In LaGrand,the ICJ ruled that the right to notification guaranteed by
the VCCR required the host state to provide review and reconsideration
of convictions resulting in prolonged detention or severe punishment
that were obtained in violation of this treaty obligation.64 Its decision
relied in part on its reading of paragraph 2 of article 36,65 which
provided that a host state's domestic laws and regulations "must enable
full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under this [a]rticle are intended., 66 The U.S. had argued that its violation

DualistConstitution, and the InternationalistConception, 51 STAN. L. REv. 529, 532-38 (1999).

59. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
60. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Provisional Measures Order of Mar. 3).
61. Germany invoked the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court in seeking enforcement
of the ICJ order, but was denied. Fed. Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111-12

(1999). Walter LaGrand also raised the ICJ order in his habeas petition. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v.
U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 477 (June 27). The Governor of Arizona rejected the ICJ's order and Arizona

executed Walter LaGrand. Id. at 479-80. For a discussion of the LaGrand provisional measures
order, see William J. Aceves, InternationalDecisions: Case Concerningthe Vienna Convention on
ConsularRelations (FederalRepublic of Germany v. United States), 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 924 (1999).
62. William J. Aceves, InternationalDecisions: LaGrand (Germany v. United States), 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 210, 212 (2002).
63. Id.
64. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 513-14 (June 27); William J. Aceves,
International Decisions: LaGrand (Germany v. United States), 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 210, 215-16

(2002).
65. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497-98 (June 27) (finding that application of
the procedural default rule violated VCCR article 36(2)).
66. VCCR, supra note 29, art. 36(2).
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of the provision did not require it to provide judicial relief to remedy
such violations.6 7 Rather, the U.S. argued, a treaty violation required
only apologies by the U.S. 68 The ICJ rejected this view, but it left the
means of how to provide review and reconsideration of such violations
to the host state.69
The U.S. has never disputed that it is subject to the jurisdiction of the
ICJ pursuant to the VCCR's Optional Protocol, nor has it disputed that
U.S. officials violated the notification obligations of article 36. Rather,
as LaGrand made clear, the dispute between the U.S. and the ICJ boils
down to a disagreement over whether U.S. treaty obligations under the
VCCR can supersede otherwise valid U.S. domestic law concerning
criminal punishment and sentencing.
The LaGrand decision did not alter U.S. court treatment of VCCR
claims. Both before and after LaGrand, U.S. courts have consistently
refused to provide judicial relief for VCCR violations. The courts have
held that the VCCR either did not create judicially enforceable rights,7 °
or if raised in habeas proceedings, that those claims of treaty violations
were barred by the doctrine of procedural default.71 Moreover, courts
have ruled that even if the VCCR did create such rights, violation of
those rights did not prejudice the defendants' trial and sentence.7 2
Such rulings were made in conformity with the views of the federal
government on the proper interpretation of the VCCR. 73 Additionally,
after LaGrand,the U.S. government took the position that the "review

67. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497-98 (June 27).

68. Id. at 488-89, 511.
69. ld. at 512, 514.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 196-98 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that

the VCCR creates no private enforceable right of action). The Supreme Court has recently agreed to
consider whether the VCCR does in fact create an individual right, and if so, whether a violation of
a VCCR right requires the suppression of evidence in a criminal proceeding. See Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, U.S. (Nov. 7, 2005), 126 S.Ct. 620 (2005) (mem.), grantingcert. to 108 P.3d 573
(Or. 2005).
71. See, e.g., Medellin v. Dretke (Medellin 1), 371 F.3d 270, 279-80 (5th Cir. 2004), cert.

dismissed, -

U.S.

-

(May 23, 2005), 125 S.Ct. 2088 (2005) (per curiam); LaGrand v. Stewart,

170 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 1999); Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 99-100 (4th Cir. 1997);

see also Memorial Submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), paras.
4.36-.47 (Sept. 16, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/iguspleadings/
iGUS-ipleadingMemorialGermany

19990916_Complete.htm.

72. See, e.g., United States v. Ore-Irawa, 78 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
73. See, e.g., Counter-Memorial Submitted by the United States of America, LaGrand (F.R.G. v.

U.S.), para. 76 (Mar. 27, 2000), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/
iguspleadings/iGUS-ipleading.-CounterMemorialUS20000327.htm.
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and reconsideration" mandated by the LaGrand decision could be
satisfied through executive clemency procedures.7 4 In other words, the
U.S. maintained that no judicial action was required to comply with the
U.S.'s treaty obligations as interpreted by the ICJ.
3.

The Avena Case

The position taken by the Court in LaGrand sparked a third round of
ICJ litigation in 2002 when Mexico applied to the ICJ on behalf of all
Mexican nationals facing execution in the U.S. 75 Mexico essentially

asked the ICJ to revisit its ruling in LaGrand and require a judicial
remedy for defendants convicted and sentenced in violation of VCCR
treaty rights.76 In Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Avena)," the ICJ
ruled in favor of Mexico and held that the VCCR required a host state to
"permit review and reconsideration of [the Mexican] nationals' cases by
the U.S. courts" to determine whether the violations "caused actual
prejudice. 78 This meant more than simply providing executive
clemency review and meant that procedural default rules should not bar
such review.79
Thus, although the ICJ had held in LaGrand that the "review and
reconsideration" required by the VCCR was left to the means chosen by
the U.S., in Avena the ICJ explained that this choice was limited to
judicial (as opposed to administrative) review. 80 Additionally, the ICJ
went out of its way to hold that the application of the procedural default
doctrine violated U.S. obligations under the VCCR. 1 It extended this
ruling to apply to all VCCR claims by foreign nationals in U.S. courts,
including nationals from countries that had not brought challenges under

74. See, e.g., Verbatim Record, Avena (Mex. v. U.S.), I.C.J. Doc. CR 2003/2, para. 3.10 (Jan. 21,
2003) (statement of Catherine W. Brown, Assistant Legal Adviser for Consular Affairs, United
States Department of State,), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuscr/
imusicr2003-01 20030121 .PDF.

75. See Memorial Submitted by Mexico, Avena (Mex. v. U.S.), paras. 347-54 (June 20, 2003),
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuspleadings/imus-ipleadings_20030620_memoriaL

06.pdf [hereinafter Avena Memorial].
76. Id. paras. 364-73.
77. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
78. Id. at 59-60.
79. Id. at 65-66.
80. Id. at 66 (explaining that the judicial process fulfills the review and reconsideration
requirement while the executive clemency process does not).
81. See id. at 65.
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the ICJ.
In sum, the ICJ's first two judgments in Breard and LaGrand were
not directly enforced by U.S. courts. But the domestic legal status of the
ICJ's judgment was not settled by the failure of U.S. courts in those
cases to give them judicial effect. In Breard, the Supreme Court
assumed that the ICJ's provisional measures order was non-binding as a
matter of international law; in LaGrand, the Court did not reach the
question. The Avena decision presented the first opportunity for U.S.
courts to squarely consider the domestic enforceability of an ICJ order
whose binding force under international law was uncontested.
B.

Medellin: The JudicialEnforceability of JCJJudgments

The ICJ's judgment in Avena applied to all Mexican nationals facing
capital sentences in the U.S. Attorneys for those Mexican nationals
immediately moved to test the impact of the Avena judgment in
domestic litigation. The first test occurred in Oklahoma state courts with
an inconclusive result. The second test occurred in federal courts hearing
petitions from Jos6 Medellin, a Mexican national facing execution by
Texas. The Texas case proved to be the road to eventual Supreme Court
consideration of the Avena decision.
1.

Oklahoma: An Inconclusive Test of the Avena Court's Implications

Before the ICJ had issued its final judgment in Avena, lawyers for the
first Mexican facing an execution, Osbaldo Torres, unsuccessfully
petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to suspend the execution pending the
ICJ's final judgment. 83 As in thcae
the cases involving Breard and LaGrand,
the U.S. Supreme Court denied, over the objections of Justices Stephen
Breyer and John Paul Stevens, 84 Torres' petition for certiorari seeking a
stay of his execution to allow the ICJ to consider the merits of Mexico's
case.85 Torres' execution date was set for May 18, 2004.86
After the ICJ's final judgment in Avena, the Oklahoma court stayed
Torres' execution with little explanation outside of a concurring

82. Id. at 57.
83. See Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1035 (2003) (mem.) (denying certiorari).
84. See id. at 1035 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1037 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1035.
86. Torres v. Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442, 43 I.L.M. 1227, 1227 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13,
2004).
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opinion.
Despite the importance of its decision, the Oklahoma court as
a whole offered no reasons for reversing its decision. The only reasoning
offered for the decision was provided in a special concurrence signed by
only two out of the three judges in the majority.88 According to Justice
Charles Chapel, who penned the concurrence, "the issue of whether this
Court must abide by [the ICJ's] opinion in Torres's case is not ours to
determine., 89 That decision, the reasoning went, had been made for the
Court by the federal government's ratification of the VCCR and the
Optional Protocol submitting the U.S. to the compulsory jurisdiction of
the ICJ. Because treaties are "supreme law" under the Constitution,
Oklahoma was bound to abide by the ICJ's interpretation of U.S. treaty
obligations. 90
Justice Chapel's concurring opinion is puzzling. He acknowledged
that the U.S. State Department had consistently argued that the VCCR
did not provide judicial remedies in domestic U.S. courts. 91 The State
Department's view, as he recognized, also had been adopted by every
U.S. court decision interpreting the VCCR.92 Despite this unanimity of
opinion, he nonetheless concluded that the ICJ's judgment, which
clearly specifies some sort of judicial remedy, has some different kind of
status because the State Department had also relied on the ICJ to make
binding resolutions under the treaty. 93 For these reasons, he wrote, the
court was bound by the ICJ's decision, even if the court would not
ordinarily enforce the treaty. 94 Thus, the court vacated Torres' sentence
and ordered a new hearing to assess the effect of the VCCR violation.9 5
It is important to note that the Oklahoma litigation did not occur in a
political and diplomatic vacuum. The federal government sent a letter to
the Governor as well as the state's board for pardons. 96 Just hours after
the Court of Criminal Appeals issued its second order vacating Torres'

87. Id.
88. Id. at 1229-32 (Chapel, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 1229.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1229 & n.17.
93. Id. at 1229.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1227 (majority opinion).
96. See Sean D. Murphy, ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
InternationalLaw: Implementation ofAvena Decision by Oklahoma Court, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 581,

582 (2004).
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sentence, the Governor of Oklahoma announced that he had commuted
Torres' sentence out of deference to the ICJ's judgment. 97 Thus, barely
one week before his scheduled execution, Torres found himself spared
by two out of the three branches of the Oklahoma government. The
difference was undoubtedly the intervening judgment by the ICJ.
2.

Testing Texas: Medellin Addresses the Ambiguities Left by Torres

Although Avena made a difference in Torres' case, the odd posture of
the Torres decision did not create a clear precedent on how or why the
ICJ order should be enforced. The concurrence failed to lay out a clear
theory for why the court should follow the ICJ order; in any event, it was
merely a special concurrence attracting the votes of two out of the five
justices. The next court to consider the effect of the ICJ's decision
provided a clearer, although different, analysis.
a.

Medellin: The Lower CourtDecisions

The next Mexican national facing execution in the U.S. was Jos6
Medellin, who had been sentenced to death by the State of Texas.9 8 At
the time of the ICJ's final judgment in Avena, Medellin had already
exhausted his state appeals and lost his first petition for habeas corpus
relief in federal district court. 99 In particular, the district court rejected
Medellin's habeas claim based on violations of the VCCR on the theory
that his VCCR claim had been "procedurally defaulted" under Texas
law. 100 Relying on the same federal statute invoked by the Supreme
Court in Breard, the federal district court also denied Medellin's request
for a certificate of appealability (COA) that would permit him to
challenge the district court's decision in appellate court.'01
While Medellin challenged the denial of his request for a COA in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,102 the ICJ announced its
97. See Press Release, Office of Governor Brad Henry, Gov. Henry Grants Clemency to Death
Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.governor.state.ok.us/displayarticle.php?article id=301&articlejtype=1 ("Under agreements entered into by the United States,
the ruling of the ICJ is binding on U.S. courts.").
98. See Medellin I, 371 F.3d 270, 273-74 (5th Cir. 2004) (describing the background and posture
of the case), cert. dismissed,U.S. - (May 23, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005) (per curiam).
99. See id. at 274.
100. See id. at 279 (noting that the petitioner conceded that his claim was procedurally defaulted
under Texas law).
101. See id. at 274-75 (relying on provisions of AEDPA).
102. See id. at 279-80 (noting the ICJ's judgment in Avena).
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intervening final judgment in Avena.' 0 3 Medellin argued that LaGrand
required U.S. courts to give him review and reconsideration for his
VCCR claim in spite of the procedural default doctrine. 10 4 The court
noted that the Avena judgment had reaffirmed the LaGrand holding.' 0 5
By refusing to grant him a hearing and denying him a COA to challenge
his state convictions, he argued, the district
court had failed to comply
10 6
with the VCCR as interpreted by the ICJ.
The Fifth Circuit rejected Medellin's argument on two grounds. First,
it continued to hold that Medellin's petition for relief under the VCCR
was procedurally defaulted. 0 7 Second, it held that even if his claim was
not defaulted, the VCCR itself provided no
individually enforceable
8
rights for which the court could grant relief. 1
The first ground proved to be the most important. Acknowledging
that the ICJ found the procedural default doctrine a violation of the
VCCR in both LaGrand and Avena, the court nonetheless refused to
follow those ICJ holdings.' 0 9 The court explained:
Though Avena and LaGrand were decided after Breard, and
contradict Breard, we may not disregard the Supreme Court's
clear holding that ordinary procedural default rules can bar
Vienna Convention claims.... That is, only the Supreme Court
may overrule a Supreme Court decision. The Supreme Court has
not overruled Breard. We are bound to follow the precedent
until taught otherwise by the Supreme Court. 0
Thus, the Fifth Circuit refused to give effect to the ICJ's judgments on
the grounds that it lacked the authority to reverse Supreme Court
precedent, even pursuant to an international court judgment.
b.

The Supreme Court's Grant of Certiorari

A number of factors made future litigation on the question of the ICJ
judgment's effect in courts almost inevitable. Unintentionally or not, the
Fifth Circuit's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Breard, and
103. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 1.C.J. 12, 12 (Mar. 31).
104. See Medellin I, 371 F.3d at 279.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 279-80.
See id. at 280.
Id.

110. Id.
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on the Supreme Court's exclusive authority to reverse its decision in
Breard, made the Supreme Court's intervention more likely.
Additionally, the Oklahoma court's decision in Torres raised the
possibility of a split between federal and state courts on the effect of the
ICJ judgment. Moreover, Mexico's application to the ICJ sought relief
for all Mexicans facing execution in the U.S.; the ICJ went further and
extended the scope of its judgment to all foreign nationals facing
execution in the U.S.
In December 2004, the Court granted Medellin's petition for a writ of
certiorari."' The Court's writ extended to two questions. First, the Court
agreed to consider whether the ICJ ruling that U.S. courts must
"reconsider petitioner Jos6 Medellin's claim for relief under the
[VCCR], without regard to procedural default doctrines" is binding on
federal courts. 1 12 Second, the Court agreed to consider whether federal
courts "should give effect, as a matter of judicial comity and uniform
treaty interpretation, to the ICJ's judgment."' '3
3.

Three Views on JudicialEnforceabilityof the ICJ's Judgment

The Court's questions elicited sharp disagreement over the judicial
enforceability of international tribunal judgments and the proper role of
domestic courts in enforcing these judgments. Medellin advocated a
strict internationalist approach giving the ICJ order direct enforceability
in U.S. courts. Texas argued that the ICJ order was not directly
enforceable at all by the Court. Meanwhile the U.S. government put
forward a somewhat surprising third view: the ICJ order was
enforceable, but only by the federal executive branch and not by the
federal courts.
a.

The InternationalistView: JudicialEnforceability of the ICJ

Medellin, the petitioner, argued that the Supreme Court was obligated
to give effect to the ICJ's interpretation of the VCCR. He argued that the
legal obligation stemmed from three U.S. treaties: the VCCR itself, the
Optional Protocol to the VCCR granting the ICJ jurisdiction over the
case, and the U.N. Charter's provision obligating member states to

U.S. (Dec. 10, 2004), 125 S. Ct. 686, 686 (2004) (mem.) (granting
111. Medellin II, certiorari), cert. dismissed, _ U.S. _ (May 23, 2005), 125 S.Ct. 2088 (2005) (per curiam).
112. Medellin Ill,- U.S. __ (May 23, 2005), 125 S.Ct. 2088, 2089 (2005) (per curiam).
113. Id.

International Delegations
comply with judgments of the ICJ. 1 14 According to Medellin, the three
treaties were the "law of the land" pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution and therefore binding on the Court. 1 5 Moreover,
the VCCR and the Optional Protocol were both "self-executing"
obligations that could and must be enforced by the Court.1 16 These
obligations thus overrode any inconsistent state law, such as the
procedural default doctrine." 7 Consequently, he argued, courts should
not apply federal habeas laws incorporating such state law doctrines in
18
the face of the ICJ's judgment.
A dizzying array of non-governmental organizations, international
legal academics, governments, and international organizations filed
briefs in support of Medellin. All of these petitions emphasized the
importance of complying with international tribunal judgments. 11 9 A
number of prominent international law experts argued that "this Court
has not only the authority but the responsibility to conclude that the
correct interpretation of an international treaty is the one settled through
an authoritative and binding process of dispute settlement, even if the
executive branch previously advanced a different position
unsuccessfully in the international litigation."1 20 In this view, the Court
should act to fulfill the U.S. foreign policy goal of compliance with
international law by implementing the ICJ's judgment, whether or not
the executive branch had instructed the Court to do so.

114. See Brief for Petitioner at 14-15, Medellin 111,
125 S.Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL
176452.
115. See id. at 14.

116. See id. at 15.
117. Seeid. at 16-17.
118. Id. at 39-42.
119. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of NAFSA: Association of International Educators et al., in
Support of Petitioner at 16-17, Medellin 111,125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 166592;

Brief Amicus Curiae of Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen and Lieutenant Colonel John J. Swift et al.,
in Support of Petitioner at 9-15, Medellin II1, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 166593;
Brief of Amici Curiae Bar Ass'ns et al.,
in Support of Petitioner at 12-16, Medellin 111,
125 S.Ct.

2088 (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 166594; Brief of Former United States Diplomats as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 13-22, Medellin Ii, 125 S.Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 176425;
Brief of Foreign Sovereigns as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner Jose Ernesto Medellin, supra
note 13, at 15-18; Brief of the American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
22-25, Medellin III, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 176451; Brief of International Law
Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14-28, Medellin I1, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 045928), 2005 WL 176453.
120. Brief of International Law Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 119,

at 29.
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Texas' View: No Enforceabilityof the ICJ Order

Texas' response to the internationalist arguments fell along two main
lines. First, Texas argued that the VCCR did not grant defendants like
Medellin individually enforceable rights.12 1 Similarly, Texas argued that
the Optional Protocol granting the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction did not
give the ICJ's judgments self-executing effect either. 22 Indeed, as some
amici argued, if the Optional Protocol did grant the ICJ's judgments selfof
executing effect, the Optional Protocol
23 would have violated principles
1
powers.
of
separation
constitutional
Texas also argued that even if the VCCR did create individually
enforceable rights, such rights could not be the basis for federal appellate
jurisdiction under federal habeas statutes.124 Such statutes, enacted in
1996, limited federal appellate jurisdiction to claims of a denial of a
constitutional right. No such jurisdiction could be invoked for claims of
statutory or treaty violations. Because the federal statute in question was
enacted later in time than the VCCR, that statute trumped any
obligations imposed by that treaty, if such obligations existed.
On this view, no federal or state court had the power to implement the
ICJ's order. Texas suggested that only the President or Congress, as well
as Texas itself, had the power to bring the U.S. into compliance with the
ICJ judgment. If none of these institutions chose to act, the courts could
not properly enforce the ICJ's order.
c.

The PresidentialistView: Executive Enforceability

Texas' response was overshadowed by a remarkable brief filed by the
U.S. Solicitor General on behalf of the U.S. While the U.S. agreed with
Texas' arguments on the non-enforceability of the ICJ judgments in
federal courts, the U.S. position went further. In addition to arguing that
the Supreme Court lacked the authority to enforce ICJ judgments, 12 5 the
U.S. also argued that the President held the exclusive authority to do
121. Respondent's Brief at 25-32, Medellin 111, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL
497765.
122. Id. at 32-37.
123. See Brief for Professors of International Law, Federal Jurisdiction and the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States as Arnici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 8-20, Medellin II, 125 S. Ct.
2088 (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 497763.
124. See Respondent's Brief, supranote 121, at 8-11.
125. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 38, Medellin 111, 125
S. Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 504490.
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12 6

Indeed, the U.S. explained that the President had exercised this
authority in this case in the form of the following memorandum:
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as
President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States
of America, that the United States will discharge its international
obligations under the decision of the International Court of
Justice in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Avena) by
having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance
with general principles of comity in cases27 filed by the 51
Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.
SO.

Thus, the President, and not the Supreme Court, had the duty and
authority to carry out the U.S. government's international obligations. In
this case, the President would require state courts to grant hearings for
Mexican nationals to "review and reconsider" the effect of treaty
28
violations on their convictions and sentences out of comity principles.
The Supreme Court was thus presented with three views of the proper
status of the ICJ's judgment in domestic U.S. law. Medellin, supported
by internationalist scholars, argued for direct judicial enforcement of the
ICJ's order. Texas rejected this view and argued that no state or federal
court had the authority to implement the ICJ's order. Finally, the U.S.
suggested that the President alone was authorized to implement the ICJ's
judgment and his intervention directing Texas courts to give effect to the
ICJ order was a proper exercise of his executive powers.
4.

The Supreme Court's Decision

The President's unusual intervention upended the Court's
consideration of the case. Medellin immediately filed a motion for a stay
of the case pending his return to Texas courts to implement the
President's order.' 29 Texas successfully opposed this motion and asked
courts
the Court to reach the merits of the case by holding that federal
30
held no appellate jurisdiction in allegations of treaty violations.1
Instead of reaching the merits, the Court dismissed the writ of
126. See id. at 38-40.
127. Id. app. 2A ("Memorandum to the Attorney General of the United States, Appendix to the
Brief of the United States Amicus Curiae") (citations omitted).
128. See id.
129. See Medellin I1, 125 S. Ct. at 2093 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing motion for stay).
130. Id.
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certiorari as improvidently granted. 13' The President's intervention, the
Court noted, may have resulted in giving Medellin the very "review and
reconsideration" that he had been seeking.132 Moreover, the numerous
procedural obstacles to Medellin's
claim in federal court could be
33
writ.'
the
dismissing
by
avoided
The Court's five-four decision was deeply divided. Four justices
argued that the case should have been remanded to the Fifth Circuit with
instructions to grant a COA to Medellin. While not reaching the merits,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor simply noted that "[r]easonable jurists can
vigorously disagree about whether and what legal effect ICJ decisions
have in our domestic courts ....
,,134 Other justices suggested that they
would have voted to grant the stay Medellin requested. 35 Inany case,
the Court made clear that it would continue to retain appellate
jurisdiction over any subsequent decision in the Texas courts as to the
enforceability of the136 President's memorandum requiring compliance
with the ICJ's order.

In sum, the VCCR litigation arising out of the ICJ's judgment in
Avena led the Supreme Court to consider, for the first time, the domestic
effect of the ICJ's interpretations of U.S. treaty obligations under the
VCCR. Although the Court's consideration of these issues was aborted
due to the President's intervention, the Court's deep divisions on how to
dispose of the case demonstrate that it plainly remains interested in
considering these issues again. Moreover, as Part II explains, the
growing significance of international tribunals likely means that
resolving questions about the domestic effect of international tribunal
judgments like Avena will become unavoidable.
II.

A NEW WORLD COURT ORDER

One of the most important developments in contemporary
international relations is the rise in number and importance of
131. Id. at 2089 (per curiam).
132. Id. at 2090.
133. See id. at 2089.
134. Id. at 2102 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135. See id. at 2106 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136. See id. at 2090 n.1 (per curiam) ("Of course Medellin, or the State of Texas, can seek
certiorari in this Court from the Texas courts' disposition of the state habeas corpus application. In
that instance, this Court would in all likelihood have an opportunity to review the Texas courts'
treatment of the President's memorandum and Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican
Nationals....").
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international tribunals. This phenomenon, which I call "a new world
court order," has two distinctive characteristics, both of which were
present in the Medellin case. The first characteristic is the proliferation
of independent international tribunals authorized to issue interpretations
of international treaty obligations binding on individual nation-states.
The second characteristic is domestic courts giving the judgments of
these increasingly ubiquitous international tribunals direct or selfexecuting legal effect.
A.

The Rise of InternationalTribunals

One of the more distinctive characteristics of the post-war, and
especially the post-Cold War, system of international relations has been
the proliferation of international tribunals. 137 By one count, there are
38
over 100 international tribunals and institutions operating today.1
Almost all of these tribunals have been established since the end of
World War 11.139
For my purposes, the term "international tribunal" refers to any
international institution holding the authority to impose binding
obligations on nations arising out of a dispute over the requirements of
international law. The term "international tribunal," which is the term
used in federal statutory law, 140 includes a variety of international
adjudicatory bodies, some of which might call themselves "courts." My
discussion excludes from this category international organizations that
issue non-binding recommendations such as the United Nations General
Assembly141 or the United Nations Human Rights Commission. 142 I also

137. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93

CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (2005); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferationof InternationalJudicialBodies:
The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709, 729 (1999).
138. See PROJECT ON INT'L COURTS

& TRIBUNALS, THE INTERNATIONAL

JUDICIARY IN

CONTEXT: A SYNOPTIC CHART (2004), http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synoptic-chart/
SynopC4.pdf (identifying 125 international bodies that have international dispute resolution
features in common).
139. Id.; see also Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, InternationalCourts and Tribunals and the
Independence of the InternationalJudge, 44 HARV. INT'L L. J. 271, 272-74 (2003).
140. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2000) ("The district court of the district in which a person
resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or
other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal
investigations conducted before formal accusation.").
141. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 10 ("The General Assembly... may make recommendations to
the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or
matters.").
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exclude organizations that impose new obligations pursuant to a
legislative process such as the process for amending the United Nations
44
Charter 43 or the agreement forming the World Trade Organization.1
My focus remains on international organizations that are empowered to
adjudicate disputes between states.
Even narrowed to this extent, classifying the array of international
tribunals is hardly a simple task. 145 Some tribunals include memberships
of nearly every nation,1 46 others have regional memberships, 47 and some
involve only two nations. 48 Some tribunals have broad jurisdiction and
competence to handle a wide variety of international disputes, 49 while
others have narrow jurisdiction limited to a particular subject matter or
set of international agreements. 150 Broadly speaking, international
142. The Commission draws its authority from the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council. See id.
art. 68 ("The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields
and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the
performance of its functions."). The Commission has no greater binding power than the Economic
and Social Council itself. See, e.g., id. art. 62 ("The Economic and Social Council... may make
recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all.").
143. See id. art. 108 ("Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members
of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the
General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by twothirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security
Council.").
144. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. X, Apr. 15, 1994,
108 Stat. 4809, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
145. The most recent scholarly effort to categorize this mass of tribunals is found in Posner &
Yoo, supra note 137, at 8-12.
146. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm [hereinafter ICJ Statute]
(stating that every member of the United Nations is a party to the Statute of the International Court
of Justice).
147. See, e.g., Statute of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Oct. 1979, reprinted in
ORG. OF AM. STATES, BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-

AMERICAN SYSTEM 155-64 (2001), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basicl7.htm
[hereinafter IACHR Statute] (limiting membership to parties to the American Convention on
Human Rights).

148. See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, Eth.-Eri., Dec. 12, 2000, available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/EEBC/E-E%20Agreement.html.
149. See, e.g., Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, May 28, 1979,

18 I.L.M. 1203.
150. See, e.g., Common Court of Justice and Arbitration of the Organization for the
Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa, OHADA Overview, http://www.juriscope.org/
infos.ohada/traite/pdf-gb/presentation-tgb.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2006).
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tribunals can be grouped into two main groups: arbitral tribunals and
international courts.
1.

Arbitral Tribunals

The most traditional form of international dispute resolution involves
the use of a special ad hoc arbitral tribunal empowered to settle a
particular set of disputes between two states. An early example is the
tribunal set up by the U.S. and Great Britain to settle claims arising out
of the Revolutionary War. 15 ' This claims commission was composed of
five commissioners, four of whom were appointed by the U.S. and
Britain and the fifth chosen by the unanimous consent of the four
appointed commissioners. 5 2 The commission was empowered to
ascertain the amount of any compensation or damages suffered by
British citizens during the war. 153 Sitting in Philadelphia, the
commission was authorized to examine witnesses under oath and to
receive evidence.

54

Most importantly, the treaty specified that any

award of the commission "shall in all cases be final and conclusive, both
as to the justice of the claim, and to the amount of the sum to be paid to
the creditor or claimant: And the United States undertake to cause the
sum so awarded to be paid ....
The use of similar commissions continues to this day. For instance, in
1979, the U.S. and Iran agreed to send all disputes arising out of Iran's
156
expropriation of U.S. property to the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal,
which still sits in The Hague. Most recently, Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed
to a bilateral claims commission to settle disputes arising out of their
civil war. 1 7 Moreover, such bilateral arbitral tribunals sometimes deal
with disputes unrelated to military conflict. For instance, fellow

151. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. VI, Nov. 19, 1794, 8
Stat. 116.

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.

155. Id.
156. See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, DEP'T ST.BULL., No. 2047, Feb. 1981, at 3, reprinted
in 20 I.L.M. 230 (1981).
157. See Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
and the Government of the State of Eritrea, Eth.-Eri., Dec. 12, 2000, available at http://www.pcacpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/EEBC/E-E%2OAgreement.html.
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European Union members Belgium and the Netherlands agreed to send a
century-old dispute over rights to the "Iron Rhine" railway line to an ad
hoc arbitral tribunal. 5 8 In the modem era, the bilateral ad hoc arbitral
tribunal is most commonly used in bilateral investment treaties, usually
between a "developed" and a "developing" country for the benefit of
developed country investors. 159
These various and disparate types of tribunals share a few key
characteristics. All of the tribunals have been created by international
agreement and exist only to resolve a discrete dispute or set of disputes.
National governments choose the members of the tribunals.
While traditional ad hoc arbitral tribunals remain commonplace, in
recent years countries have agreed to submit disputes to hybrid arbitral
tribunals. Hybrid arbitral tribunals combine the flexibility of the arbitral
process with the independence of the other main form of international
tribunal: the international court. Like ad hoc arbitral tribunals, hybrid
tribunals have arbitrators chosen by the governments themselves. Unlike
ad hoc tribunals, however, hybrid arbitral tribunals often pre-select the
arbitrators prior to any particular dispute by creating a list or panel of
available arbitrators. This limits the ability of the countries involved in a
dispute to select the particular arbitrator for a particular dispute.
Moreover, hybrid arbitral tribunals have their own set of pre-existing
procedural rules. Most importantly, a number of hybrid arbitral tribunals
permit appeals from decisions of arbitration panels to an appellate body
composed of permanent arbitrators.
The hybrid model has proved popular and has been widely adopted by
the U.S. in trade agreements like the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) 160 and investment dispute agreements like the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States. 16 1 The most prominent hybrid tribunal is
the dispute resolution system of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The WTO Secretariat keeps an "indicative list" of qualified
158. See Exchange of Notes between Belgium and the Netherlands, July 22, 2003, available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/BENL/BE-NL%20Arbitration%2OAgreement.pdf.
159. See, e.g., Model U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 24 (2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeSectors/Investment/ModelBIT/asset.uploadjfile847_6897.pdf.
160. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1116, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
605 (1993); see also North American Free Trade Implementation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 1031082, 107 Stat. 2057 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (2000)) (implementing NAFTA
agreement as part of U.S. law).
161. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, arts. 37-40, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
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arbitrators.

62

This list is drawn from the member countries.

163

When a

dispute arises, the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO appoints a panel
of arbitrators from this list, none of whom can be nationals of the
countries involved in the dispute. 64 After the initial panel issues its
decisions, countries may appeal to the Appellate Body, which is
composed of seven permanent arbitrators, three of whom can166hear an
appeal.165 Such permanent arbitrators serve terms of four years.

2.

InternationalCourts

International courts are permanent stand-alone institutions with
judges who are given a substantial level of independence. Unlike arbitral
tribunals, international courts also have a wider scope of jurisdiction to
resolve disputes beyond a particular international agreement. Although
ad hoc tribunals remain commonplace, recent trends suggest that
international courts will continue to grow in number and importance.
The ICJ is perhaps the most prominent example of this type of
tribunal. 167 The ICJ was created by agreement pursuant to the United
Nations Charter. 168 The ICJ Statute, which organizes the ICJ as an
institution, is incorporated as a treaty by the Charter. 69 The fifteen
justices of the ICJ are elected by 7the
General Assembly and the Security
0
Council for a term of nine years.
The ICJ is unique among international tribunals because it is the only
tribunal explicitly incorporated into the U.N. Charter and the only
tribunal that holds, for those countries who have accepted it, compulsory
jurisdiction over any type of dispute involving international law. 17 ' The
162. See World Trade Organization, The Process-Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement
Case,
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop.e/dispue/disp-settlement-cbt e/c6s3p2-e.htm
(last
visited Oct. 17, 2005).

163. Id.
164. WTO Agreement, supra note 144, annex 2, art. 8, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs.e/legal-e/28-dsu.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2006).
165. Id.
166. Id. art. 17.
167. See Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court Biased?, 34 J.

LEGAL STUD. 599, 600 (2005).
168. U.N. Charter arts. 92-94.
169. Id. art. 92, para. 1 ("The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon
the Statute of the Permanent Court of Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.").
170. ICJ Statute, supra note 146, art. 3.
171. The United States made such a general declaration in 1946 subject to two reservations
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Charter requires that: "Each Member of the United Nations undertakes
to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any
case to which it is a party."' 72 Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court
permits states to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory
with respect to treaty violations, general international law, particular
73
breaches of international law, and remedies for those breaches. 1
Other international courts have similar powers with respect to
regional agreements. The Court of Justice of the European Community
(ECJ), for instance, is authorized to hear any dispute between members
of the European Community (EC) with regard to European law. 174 As I
discuss in the next Section, the ECJ's decisions have also been widely
followed by European national courts. 175 Regional courts have also been
established with regard to regional human rights treaties. 176 The broad
scope of these treaties effectively grants these courts a wide scope of
jurisdiction.
Aside from regional courts, two other prominent international courts
rivaling the ICJ in importance have been established in recent years. In

limiting its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction to matters outside the domestic jurisdiction of
the United States and for disputes arising out of multilateral treaties. See REMARKS OF HON. TOM
CONNALLY RELATIVE TO THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, S. DOC. NO. 79-58, at 7 (1945); Recognition of Compulsory
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 92 CONG.REC. 10,694 (1946), reprinted in DEP'T
ST. BULL., Sept. 1946, at 452-53. The United States later revoked this general acceptance of
compulsory jurisdiction in 1984 after receiving an adverse judgment in a case brought by
Nicaragua. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 17 (June 27).
The United States, however, has continued to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ for
particular multilateral treaties, including the Vienna Convention for Consular Relations. See VCCR
and Optional Protocol, supranote 29, art 1.
172. U.N. Charter art. 94(1).
173. ICJ Statute, supra note 146, art. 36(2). Article 36(2) states:
The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting
the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
Id.
174. See CURIA, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, http://www.curia.eu.intl/
en/instit/presentationfr/indexcje.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2006).
175. See infra Part II.C.2.
176. See, e.g., IACHR Statute, supra note 147; see also Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of
the Cartagena Agreement, May 28, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1203.
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2002, sixty member countries joined to establish the International
Criminal Court, which is authorized to issue binding judgments
obligating countries to prosecute or extradite individuals alleged to have
committed genocide, war crimes, aggression, or crimes against
humanity. 177 In 1994, the revised Law of the Sea Treaty established the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which has jurisdiction to
resolve any set
of disputes arising from the interpretation or application
178
treaty.
the
of
B.

U.S. Participationin InternationalAdjudication

The U.S. is an active participant in the trend toward more
international adjudication. While the exact number of U.S. agreements to
submit to international dispute resolution is unknown, there is no doubt
that the overall number is substantial. 179 Many appear to require bilateral
arbitration before a tribunal whose members are chosen by the U.S. and
its treaty partner. Perhaps as a reflection of the growth of international
tribunals, the U.S. has agreed to compulsory dispute resolution by a wide
variety of international courts staffed by judges over whom it exercises
little control. Agreements to arbitration by bilateral tribunals and dispute
resolution by international courts may provide for voluntary or
compulsory jurisdiction.

177. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 89, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Article
89 states:
Surrender of persons to the Court
The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together with the
material supporting the request outlined in article 91, to any State on the territory of which that
person may be found and shall request the cooperation of that State in the arrest and surrender
of such a person. States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and the
procedure under their national law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender.
Id.
178. UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 21. Article 21 states:
Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal comprises all disputes and all applications submitted to it in
accordance with this Convention and all matters specifically provided for in any other
agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal.
Id. I discuss the treaty's obligations on the member states to grant self-executing status to the Law
of the Sea tribunals in Part IV.
179. My own review of the U.S. Treaties database reveals that the U.S. is party to nearly 300
agreements to international dispute resolution.
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U.S. Agreements to BilateralAd Hoc Arbitration

The U.S. is currently party to hundreds of agreements to ad hoc
arbitration. Such agreements provide for the selection of arbitrators by
the parties to the agreements themselves and the jurisdiction of such
tribunals is generally sharply limited to matters designated by the
agreements. 80 Moreover, in many cases, executive agreements contain
these provisions without any ratification or input by Congress or the
Senate. 81
U.S. agreements to ad hoc arbitration may create tribunals with
voluntary jurisdiction over the parties. This means that even after a
dispute has arisen, both parties to the agreement must agree to arbitration
before any arbitral tribunal can be constituted. Additionally, the
obligations to arbitrate are often contained in agreements that are
otherwise non-binding, such as a memorandum of understanding or
framework agreement. For instance, the U.S. and South Africa entered
into a 2001 agreement to cooperate in scientific and environmental
development. 82 The agreement includes a provision to resolve disputes
over intellectual property through arbitration. The provision states that
"[u]pon mutual agreement of the Parties, a dispute shall be submitted to
an arbitral tribunal for binding arbitration in accordance with the
applicable rules of international law. Each Party shall, consistent with its
national law, give full effect to any decision or award of the arbitral
tribunal."' 83 This agreement is merely an agreement to consider
arbitration once a dispute has arisen. Neither party has any obligation to
accept arbitration even if the other party asks for it.
The U.S. is also party to arbitral agreements that grant compulsory
180. See, e.g., Investment Incentive Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Republic of Honduras, U.S.-Hond., art. IV(a), July 21, 2004, State Dept. No. 04-236, 2004 WL

2544878 ("Any dispute between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Honduras regarding the interpretation of this Agreement or which,
in the opinion of either party hereto, presents a question of international law arising out of any
project or activity for which Investment Support has been provided shall be resolved .. . [by] an

arbitral tribunal."); see also supra Part II.A.
181. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 77 n.58 (Comm. Print 2001) (reporting

that since 1939, 90 percent of all U.S. international agreements take the form of executive
agreements).
182. Framework Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Scientific, Technological and
Environmental Fields, U.S.-S. Afr., art. XII, Aug. 27, 2001, Temp. State Dep't No. 01-96, 2001 WL
1355666.
183. Id. annex A, art. I(D).
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jurisdiction once a dispute has arisen. These agreements commit the U.S.
government to accept the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal even if it no
longer wishes to arbitrate the dispute. For example, a 2002 investment
incentive agreement between the U.S. and Palau provides that where
negotiations to resolve matters of international law fail, the dispute
"shall be submitted, at the initiative of either Government, to an arbitral
tribunal for resolution."'' 84 Such a tribunal will include a member
appointed by each government and the third member will be appointed
by the two appointees and must be a citizen of a third state.185
Such compulsory arbitration agreements are not limited to bilateral
agreements. A number of international conventions or protocols to
international conventions include compulsory arbitration provisions as
part of a menu of dispute resolution options. For example, the recent
U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime obligates
parties to compulsory arbitration. If the parties do not agree to arbitrate,
186
parties must submit their dispute to the International Court of Justice.
Many of these conventions, however, permit the states to join without
binding themselves to87 dispute resolution, as the U.S. has done on a
number of occasions.
2.

U.S. Agreements to Dispute Resolution by InternationalCourts

In addition to arbitration, the U.S. has also agreed to both voluntary
and compulsory dispute resolution by international courts. The U.S. is
party to several international conventions that provide for voluntary
dispute resolution by an international court, usually the ICJ. For
example, the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
provides the ICJ as an option for parties who do not choose arbitration as

184. Investment Incentive Agreement, U.S.-Palau, art. 4(a), Mar. 15, 2002, Temp. State Dep't
No. 02-37, 2002 WL 1025083 (emphasis added).
185. Id.
186. U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime art. 35(2), Dec. 13, 2000, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 108-16, 2000 WL 34248775 ("Any dispute between two or more States Parties
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention that cannot be settled through
negotiation within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of those States Parties, be submitted
to arbitration. If, six months after the date of the request for arbitration, those States Parties are
unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those States Parties may refer the
dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in accordance with the Statute of the
Court.").
187. See, e.g., Stockholm Convention on Organic Pollutants, May 22-23, 2001, S.TREATY DOC.
No. 107-5, 2001 WL 1875757.
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the exclusive mechanism for dispute resolution.' s8 Moreover, in some
cases, the ICJ can only acquire jurisdiction if provided for by mutual
consent of the parties., 8 9
The U.N. Charter grants the ICJ general compulsory jurisdiction over
essentially any question involving international law.' 90 Although this
provision is optional rather than mandatory, many countries have agreed
to such general compulsory jurisdiction.! 9 1 The U.S. accepted such
compulsory jurisdiction until 1984,192
when it withdrew this acceptance
93
Nicaragua.1
with
dispute
a
during
Despite the 1984 withdrawal, the U.S. is still party to a number of
agreements granting the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction over disputes
arising out of those particular agreements. 94 This was the basis for the
ICJ's jurisdiction over the VCCR litigation that eventually led to the
Medellin case. 195 The Optional Protocol provides that "[d]isputes arising
out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may
accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any
party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol."' 96 Although
188. U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime art. 35(2), Dec. 13, 2000, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 108-16, 2000 WL 34248775.
189. See, e.g., Convention on Cybercrime art. 45(2), Nov. 23, 2001, S.TREATY DOC. NO. 108-11,
2001 WL 34368783 ("In case of a dispute between Parties as to the interpretation or application of
this Convention, they shall seek a settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other
peaceful means of their choice, including submission of the dispute..., to an arbitral tribunal
whose decisions shall be binding upon the Parties, or to the International Court of Justice, as agreed
upon by the Parties concerned.").
190. See U.N. Charter art. 94.
191. See ICJ, Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicdeclarations.htm (last visited Jan. 7,
2006).
192. Declaration by the President of the United States of America, Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218,
T.I.A.S. No. 1598, 1946 WL 25470 (respecting recognition by the United States of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice).
193. United States: Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by
Nicaragua at the International Court of Justice, Jan. 18, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 246 (withdrawing from
ICJ's jurisdiction in case involving Nicaragua).
194. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation between the United States of
America and The Kingdom of Belgium, U.S.-Belg., Feb. 21, 1961, 14 U.S.T. 1284, 1963 WL
65122; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and
the Kingdom of Denmark, U.S.-Den., Oct. 1, 1951, 12 U.S.T. 908, 1961 WL 62672; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
Greece, U.S.-Greece, Aug. 3, 1951, 5 U.S.T. 1829, 1954 WL 43300.
195. See supra Part I.
196. VCCR, supra note 29, Optional Protocol, art. 1.
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the U.S. withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the VCCR during the
consideration of the Medellin case by the Supreme Court,' 97 it still
remains party to at least seventy treaties with identical provisions,
including the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and a number
of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties.' 98
C.

Theories of Compliance with InternationalTribunals

Whatever form an international tribunal takes, and no matter the
scope of its jurisdiction, it always faces the difficult problem of winning
enforcement of its judgments. Unlike domestic courts, an international
tribunal's judgment is rarely backed by an executive with enforcement
power. The closest international analog to a domestic court's reliance on
police and other executive officials to enforce its judgments is the U.N.
Security Council, which is designated to "make recommendations or
decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to" an ICJ judgment. 99
But the Security Council has never exercised this power to issue
resolutions requiring compliance with an ICJ order.
Perhaps the most obvious mechanism for ensuring compliance with
an international tribunal judgment is enforcement by the domestic court
of the state suffering the adverse judgment. Such enforcement by
domestic courts, however, is rare or non-existent because most
international agreements fail to specify any particular domestic
mechanism for enforcing international law obligations. The ICJ Statute
to identify any
is no different. For this reason, scholars have been unable
200
U.S. court that has directly enforced an ICJ judgment.
Scholars have devoted substantial attention to the effect of
international tribunals on national behavior and compliance with
international law. A number of leading scholars in the U.S. have
advocated using the interaction between international tribunals and
national courts to foster compliance by states with international law.
197. See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at AI
(describing a letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General
of the United Nations, withdrawing the U.S. from the Optional Protocol).
198. See Fred L. Morrison, Treaties as a Source of Jurisdiction, Especially in U.S. Practice, in
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 58, 78-81 (Lori F. Damrosch ed.,
1987).
199. U.N. Charter art. 94(2).
200. See CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 184 (2004) (reviewing court decisions interpreting ICJ opinions and failing to
cite any that enforce an ICJ order).
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Although these scholars typically share a commitment to compliance
with international law, they approach the question of the proper
relationship between international tribunals and domestic courts in two
distinctive ways.
1.

Liberal Internationalism

Liberal internationalism is the older, more traditional scholarship on
international tribunals. Its adherents support expanding the power and
effectiveness of international tribunals.20 1 Such scholarship heavily
emphasizes the importance of international cooperation through formal
instruments such as treaties and international institutions. Scholars
writing in this vein generally argue that the U.S. should, and perhaps
must, comply with its international law obligations as interpreted by
international tribunals. 2
For many of these scholars, the favored method of improving
compliance of nation-states, in particular the U.S., has been the
enforcement of international tribunal judgments as domestic law by U.S.
courts, both federal and state.20 3 Such scholars support the formal
incorporation of international law obligations, as interpreted by
international tribunals, and generally reject constitutional obstacles to
such incorporation. For example, liberal internationalist scholars have
of provisional
argued that judgments of the ICJ, including orders
20 4
measures, should be directly enforced by U.S. courts.
As Professor Lori Damrosch argued in reference to enforcement of
ICJ orders in Breard, the U.S. Supreme Court "should have undertaken
its own scrutiny notwithstanding the executive branch's submission that
the petitions were not well-founded., 20 5 She explains that courts should
201. For a discussion of liberal internationalism, see Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of
InternationalCooperation: TransgovernmentalNetworks and the Future of InternationalLaw, 43
VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
202. Leading examples of theorists in this field include Thomas Franck and Louis Henkin. See
generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995);
Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979).

203. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Domestic Influence of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 26 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 787, 791-92 (1998); Richard A. Falk, Towards a Theory of the Participationof
Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1961); Richard B. Lillich, Invoking InternationalHuman
Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 393-94 (1985).
204. See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Justiciabilityof Paraguay'sClaim of Treaty Violation,
92 AM. J. INT'L L. 697, 703 (1998).
205. Id.
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make their own determinations because noncompliance with even a
provisional international tribunal judgment can have adverse
consequences such as:
- weakening the credibility of [the U.S.] respect for law,
including its ability to encourage respect for law by foreign
states as well as its own citizens;
- increasing the likelihood of criticism from foreign states
directly or in the form of U.N. action; ...
- weakening the legitimacy of [the U.S.] bargaining posture
and deepening its dispute with the other party; ...[and]
- weakening the fabric of international relations on which [the
U.S.] along with other states, relies to maintain international
order.2 °6
Professor Damrosch's argument exemplifies two important
components of the liberal internationalist view. First, domestic courts
have the authority and the obligation to conduct their own determination
of the legal effect of international tribunal judgments even when they
have been asked by the political branches not to do so. Second, domestic
courts have the authority and the obligation to consider various factors,
including international relations and the international rule of law, in
making this determination.
2.

Liberal Transnationalism

In the past decade, a new wave of international law scholarship,
known as liberal transnationalism, has sought to bring a different
approach to the question of state compliance with international law and
tribunals. Borrowing from the constructivist school of international
relations scholarship, 20 7 these liberal transnationalist scholars emphasize
the dialogic and communicative aspect of domestic court interaction
with international tribunals. Shunning the traditional focus on interstate
disputes, they emphasize the importance of conceptualizing a
"transnational" legal system involving more than national governments.
Thus, by disaggregating the state into its constituent elements, the
206. Id. (quoting Bernard H. Oxman, Jurisdiction and the Power tQ Indicate Provisional
Measures, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 323, 332-33 (Lori F.
Damrosch ed., 1987)).
207. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations: A Dual
Agenda, 87 Am.J. INT'L L. 205, 226-38 (1993) (discussing a possible bridge between "liberal
internationalist" theory and constructivist institutionalism).
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transnational legal system includes individuals, government agencies,
courts, international institutions and other actors.20 8
Many liberal transnationalist scholars focus on the "dialogue"
between two such disaggregated actors-a domestic court and an
international tribunal. 0 9 Such dialogue may lead a domestic court to
enforce an international tribunal judgment out of deference to that
tribunal. 2 A more activist version of this scholarship has argued that
this dialogue should be a tool in encouraging (or even forcing) state
compliance
with international rules through a transnational legal
2 11
process.

a.

The European Model for Liberal Transnationalists

For many liberal transnationalist scholars, the paradigmatic model for
the use of international tribunals in fostering state compliance with
international law is the ECJ. It has had success in having its judgments
and interpretations obeyed by the domestic courts of Europe. Modem
ECJ judgments are treated as binding and authoritative interpretations of
European law. Known as "direct effect," this doctrine provides that
European legal norms "may be invoked by individuals before their state
courts, which must provide adequate legal remedies for the E.C. norms
just as if they were enacted by the state legislature. 21 2 In practice, direct
effect meant that countries "violating their Community obligations could
not shift the locus of dispute" to the international level.2 13 Such
their own courts
governments would have to defend their actions "before
2t4
order.",
legal
own
their
within
individuals
at the suit of
The rise of direct effect in the ECJ system was hardly required by the
treaties establishing the ECJ. The question of the status of ECJ
judgments and EC law within member states of the European
community was not discussed at all during the negotiations of the Treaty
208. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 503, 522-23 (1995) (discussing the disaggregation of the state).

209. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 12, at 460-77 (arguing for an "antiparochialism" canon to
facilitate relationships between national and international courts); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Court to
Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 708, 708-10 (1998) (describing the importance of dialogue between
judges on international and domestic courts).
210. See Slaughter, supra note 209, at 710.
211. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 12, at 468-75.
212. Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformationof Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2413 (1991).

213. Id. at 2414.
214. Id.
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of Rome.21 5 In fact, the text of the Treaty of Rome neither specifies any
particular domestic mechanism to enforce ECJ judgments nor does the
Treaty, or any subsequent treaties, establish the domestic legal status of
European law in general.2 16 Instead, the doctrine of direct effect and the
eventual supremacy of European law were established by judgments of
the ECJ itself in conjunction with domestic courts of European member
states. Hence, as Professor Joseph Weiler famously observed, the rise of
Europe as a single legal community was not led by the member states
via political and diplomatic negotiations; 2' 7 rather, the rise of a Europewide law can be attributed more to the ECJ than to any other
institution.21 8
The ECJ model of an international court instigating and shaping a
political and legal transformation has been widely embraced by leading
transnationalist theorists. As Professor Laurence Helfer and Dean AnneMarie Slaughter, two of the leading scholars of this model, explain:
[S]tripping the state of its unitary facade creates the possibility
of direct relationships between the tribunals and different
governmental institutions such as courts, administrative
agencies, and legislative committees. The result, at least in
Europe, has been the emergence of a "community of law": a
partially insulated sphere in which legal actors interact based on
common interests and values, protected from direct political
interference.219
The success of the ECJ in particular demonstrates how an international
court can actively shape and foster adherence to its decisions by
convincing domestic courts to give effect to its judgments.
b.

Dialogueand Networks

Unlike liberal internationalists, liberal transnationalists emphasize the
importance of dialogue and networks between international and
215. KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 217-21 (2001). The Treaty of Rome established the

European Economic Community in 1957 eventually leading to the creation of the European Union.
216. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11.

217. Weiler, supra note 212, at 2413-23.
218. See id.; see also Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational
Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 5-6 (1981).

219. Laurence Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 277 (1997).
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domestic courts. 220 For this reason, such scholars usually recommend
that domestic courts should use discretionary powers to "choose a path
that furthers the development of an ordered, functional international
judicial system by fostering communication among participants in the
system., 221 Dialogue and networks between domestic courts and
international tribunals lead domestic courts to enforce or follow
international tribunal judgments out of "comity" even if the legal
obligation to do so is not clear.
Alternatively, a domestic court's recognition of its duty to develop a
dialogue and relationship with international tribunals might lead it to go
further. As Professor Jenny Martinez has argued, U.S. courts should
adopt a presumption in favor of enforcing international tribunal
judgments absent any countervailing legislative provision or
constitutional conflict.222 In her view, no serious constitutional conflict is
likely to occur because domestic courts adopt merely a presumption in
favor of enforcement, rather than a view that they have a legal obligation
to do so.
In sum, the arrival of the twenty-first century coincides with the rise
of an ever-increasing number of international tribunals. These tribunals
take many forms, ranging from bilateral arbitral tribunals to stand-alone
independent international courts. I call this phenomenon a "new world
court order." The U.S. has not stayed aloof from this important
phenomenon. In addition to its participation in the ICJ system, it is party
to hundreds of arbitration and dispute resolution agreements, many of
which empower international tribunals to invoke compulsory
jurisdiction.
The confluence of these two forces has encouraged leading scholars
to justify domestic judicial enforcement of these tribunals' judgments.
While liberal internationalists suggest that domestic judicial enforcement
is a legal requirement, transnationalists suggest that it is a discretionary
decision for courts. Whether out of "antiparochialism '22 3 or
"dialectalism," 224 or out of formal legal obligation, domestic courts
should, in the view of these scholars, seek to carry out judgments and

220. See A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 12, at 65-100 (describing "judicial networks"
between judges of different countries).
221.
222.
223.
224.

Martinez, supra note 12, at 434.
Id. at 500.
See Martinez, supra note 12, at 434.
See Ahdieh, supra note 12, at 2086.
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interpretations issued by international tribunals. Despite the differences
between the liberal internationalist and transnationalist approaches, both
sets of scholars advocate a similar approach to domestic court interaction
with international tribunals. Under either approach, domestic courts and
international tribunals can usher in a new world court order
characterized by international cooperation, respect for international law,
and the development of an international judicial system.225
III.

U.S. LAW AND COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS

As the Supreme Court's short-lived consideration of Medellin
demonstrates, the U.S. remains exposed to adverse judgments by
tribunals to which it is obligated to comply as a matter of international
law. The U.S. is party to a number of agreements committing it to
binding dispute resolution by international courts or arbitral tribunals.
But U.S. obligations under international law to comply with
international tribunal judgments do not necessarily translate into U.S.
domestic-law obligations. Liberal internationalist and transnationalist
scholars have generally assumed that constitutional law gives domestic
courts independent authority to bring the U.S. into compliance with such
judgments.22 6
This Part argues, consistent with the Supreme Court's treatment of
Medellin, that the determination of how and whether to comply with an
international tribunal judgment is part of the foreign affairs power of the
U.S. While scholars have debated whether the locus of the foreign
affairs power rests with the President or Congress, none of them suggest
that it resides in the court system. Not surprisingly, therefore, a review
of U.S. practice confirms that the foreign affairs power to determine
whether and how to comply with an international tribunal judgment is
exercised exclusively by either the President or Congress.
A.

Compliance as the ForeignAffairs Power

At first glance, the question of how and whether to comply with an
international tribunal judgment seems to pose a judicial question. The
petitioners and amici in Medellin, for instance, argued that the Supreme
Court has both the constitutional authority and legal obligation to give
225. See, e.g., id.; see also Damrosch, supra note 204, at 703.
226. See supra Part 1.
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effect to the ICJ's interpretation.227 Justice Breyer suggested a similar
approach. In an earlier dissent from a denial of certiorari he argued that
the ICJ's authoritative interpretation could bind the Supreme Court's
determination.22 8
This understanding of the domestic legal status of international
tribunal judgments misconceives the nature of international law in the
U.S. system. First, U.S. law generally adheres to a dualist framework
that treats international legal obligations as separate and independent
from domestic legal obligations. Second, the decision whether or how to
comply with an international legal obligation directly implicates the
foreign affairs power of the U.S. government.
1.

The DualistFramework: Domestic and InternationalCompliance

U.S. judicial precedents and government practice have long endorsed
a "dualist" conception of the status of international law. 229 This
conception holds that international law exists on two different planes:
international and domestic. The existence of these two planes means that
a country may incur an international obligation on the international plane
while still having no obligation in the domestic plane to enforce that
international obligation.
A number of well-settled legal doctrines illustrate the entrenched
nature of the dualist conception in U.S. law. For instance, U.S. courts
have consistently held that Congress may override a treaty obligation by
enacting a statute later in time.230 When endorsing this practice, courts
have pointed out that Congress' action only has a domestic effect and
does not necessarily nullify the international legal obligation. 23' A
similar notion supports the U.S. doctrine subordinating international
232
obligations, including treaties, to constitutional prohibitions.
Moreover, courts have indicated that they will give the executive
substantial deference in the interpretation of customary international

227. See supra Part 11.
228. Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1037-41 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for certiorari).
229. See Bradley, supra note 58, at 530-32 (describing the theory of dualism).
230. See, eg., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888). For a fuller discussion of the
last-in-time rule, see Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for
Treaties and FederalStatutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319 (2005).
231. See, e.g., Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194-95.
232. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
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law233 and treaties. 234
U.S. courts have also subordinated customary international law
obligations to positive domestic U.S. law. Thus, in the Supreme Court's
famous formulation, "[i]nternational law is part of our law," but it is
only given effect where there is no "treaty and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision .
,,.32
This understanding of
customary international law suggests, for instance, that the President, as
well as Congress, may override a customary international law obligation
as a matter of domestic law.
International tribunal judgments are no exception to the dualist
framework. International tribunal judgments, like treaties and customary
international law, impose obligations on the U.S. on the international
plane. But, like treaties and customary international law, international
tribunal judgments may have international legal effect while at the same
time having no domestic legal effect. In order for an international
tribunal judgment to have domestic legal effect, petitioners like Medellin
must identify some domestic legal authority determining whether or how
to comply with that judgment.
2.

The ForeignAffairs Power

The foreign affairs power is the power of the U.S. government to
make foreign policy determinations on behalf of the U.S. For example,
the foreign affairs power is exercised by the President's determination to
recognize or to not recognize a particular foreign government. It is
exercised by Congress when, for example, Congress chooses to
condemn a foreign government and withdraw foreign aid to that
government. This power is also exercised when Congress violates
treaties by statute and when the President violates customary
international law.
When the President or Congress chooses to defy an international
tribunal judgment, they are exercising their authority to make
determinations about the goals of U.S. foreign policy. For example,
when President Ronald Reagan withdrew the U.S. from the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ as a result of Nicaragua's lawsuit accusing the
233. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
234. See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) ("Although
not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged
with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.").
235. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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U.S. of mining Nicaraguan harbors,236 he was making a determination
that U.S. foreign policy goals trumped the necessity of accepting the
ICJ's judgment. Sometimes the President or Congress might determine
that U.S. foreign policy goals require compliance with international
obligations,23 7 but sometimes they do not.238 In either case, the decision
as to the goals of U.S. foreign policy is not a legal one. Given the
existence of these well-settled powers to control foreign policy in
defiance of international obligations, it is difficult to deny that Congress
and the President also hold the power to defy international tribunal
judgments.
Scholars dispute whether the foreign affairs power is wholly vested in
the executive or legislative branch. 239 The importance of this foreign
affairs power naturally raises Professor Edward Corwin's famous
question: "Where does the Constitution lodge the power to determine the
foreign relations of the United States? '' 240 In other words, which branch
exercises the foreign affairs power of the U.S.? The answer to this
question has been hotly debated between two camps. One side maintains
that the Constitution grants the President the near-exclusive power to
determine foreign affairs with strictly limited interference by
Congress. 24 1 The other side argues that Congress 242exercises nearly
complete control over all aspects of the foreign policy.
I do not need to resolve that debate here. Whether the power to
determine foreign relations policy lies with the President or Congress,
236. For a discussion and overview of the case, see Military andParamilitaryActivities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
237. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note
125, at 40-41 (explaining that the President has the authority to comply with an ICJ order by
requiring state court compliance with the judgment).
238. See, e.g., Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 850 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting Congress'
refusal to comply with U.N.-imposed sanctions on Rhodesia).
239. For an incisive summary and analysis of this debate, see H. JEFFERSON

POWELL, THE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER 8-19 (2004).

240. Id. at 3-4 (discussing Corwin's question and answer). See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN,
THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 26 (Randall W. Bland et al., eds., New York

University Press, 5th rev. ed. 1984).
241. See, e.g., 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 159, 160, 162 (1986) (arguing that the President holds
"wide and inherent discretion to act for the nation" and "presumptively exclusive authority ...in
foreign affairs").
242. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 3 (David Gray
Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996) [hereinafter Adler & George] ("The Constitution assigns to
Congress senior status in a partnership with the president for the purpose of conducting foreign
affairs.").
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neither side claims that this power has been allocated to the courts. 2 43 In
fact, the courts have traditionally invoked doctrines such as the political
question doctrine in order to avoid ruling on cases implicating foreign
affairs.2 44 Thus, it is fair to say that wherever the Constitution lodges the
power to determine the foreign relations of the U.S., it does not lodge
that power in the courts.
B.

Mechanismsfor Compliance with InternationalTribunal
Judgments

A review of U.S. mechanisms for complying with international
tribunal judgments reveals that, in practice, courts have little or no
independent role in the enforcement of international obligations. First,
the most common domestic mechanism for complying with an
international tribunal judgment is independent action by the executive
branch. Second, the U.S. may also fulfill its obligations by legislative
action or by the independent action of a state governor or legislation.
Finally, even though domestic federal and state courts rarely ensure
compliance with international tribunal judgments, executive and
legislative oversight strictly controls such enforcement actions. This
review of U.S. practice supports my claim that the enforcement of
245
international obligations is a foreign affairs determination.
1.

Executive Compliance

The executive branch's power to comply with international tribunal
judgments flows not only from statutory delegations by Congress, 246 but
also from the President's inherent constitutional powers to oversee
foreign affairs.247 In particular, Article II vests the President with the
executive power, the duty to "take care" that laws are executed, the

243. Leading expressions of the debate over control of the foreign affairs powers leave the role of
the courts unexamined. Compare 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 160, 162 (arguing that the President
holds "wide and inherent discretion to act of the nation" and "presumptively exclusive
authority... in foreign affairs"), with Adler & George, supra note 242.
244. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004-06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(applying the political question doctrine to avoid resolving a challenge to the President's withdrawal
from a treaty).
245. See supra Part III.A.2.
246. See 19 U.S.C. § 3538(b) (2000) (delegating to the Commerce Department the power to
comply with WTO tribunal decisions).
247. See U.S. CONST. art. II.
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power to appoint ambassadors, and the power to make treaties. 2 48 This
combination of constitutional powers has led the Supreme Court to
declare that the President is the "sole organ" for the conduct of foreign
affairs.249
The executive has a variety of legal tools for ensuring compliance.
First, the executive, through the supervision of administrative agencies,
can directly modify U.S. law by altering an administrative determination
or regulation to comply with an international tribunal judgment. The use
of administrative regulations to effect international tribunal judgments
may be expressly authorized by statute or not. For instance, the U.S.
Department of Commerce has the statutory authority to impose tariffs or
other types of duties on foreign products. 250 The Commerce Department
also has the authority, pursuant to legislation creating the WTO, to issue
a determination to "render the [Commerce Department's] action
[relating to the imposition of duties as] not inconsistent with the findings
of the panel or the Appellate Body" of the WTO. 251' The U.S. Treasury
Department, on the other hand, relied on its general statutory authority
over economic sanctions on foreign governments to issue regulations
implementing the Algiers Accords resolving the hostage dispute with
Iran. This has served as the basis for U.S. courts to comply with
judgments of the U.S-Iran Claims Tribunal.252 Similarly, President
George W. Bush recently relied on his general statutory authority to
impose tariffs to lower duties on steel imports after an adverse final
judgment from the WTO's Appellate Body.253
In addition to altering existing practices or administrative regulations,
the executive branch may have the authority to sue a state or local
government to force it to comply with an international agreement. On
two occasions, the executive branch has sued local governments to
require compliance with executive agreements granting tax exemptions

248. Id.
249. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
250. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d).
251. Id. § 3538(b).
252. See, e.g., Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1985).
253. See Press Release, To Provide for the Termination of Action Taken with Regard to Imports
of Certain Steel Products by the President of the United States of America a Proclamation (Dec. 4,
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/1 2/20031204-7.html; Appellate
Body Report, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products,

WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R, WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R,
WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R, WT/DS259/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003).
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to foreign consular officials and diplomats.25 4 Although this power has
never been exercised to enforce an international tribunal judgment, these
precedents do suggest that lawsuits may be brought to enforce
international tribunal judgments authorized by treaties.
Finally, the executive appears to have some general authority to
preempt inconsistent state law by declaring compliance with
international tribunal judgments a national foreign policy objective. The
Supreme Court opened the door to this practice in a 2003 decision
overturning a California statute requiring insurance companies to
disclose information concerning Holocaust-era policies. 2 " President
Bush may have relied on this decision when he issued his memorandum
requiring state courts to comply with the ICJ's judgment in Avena. His
memorandum declared that it was his determination that the U.S. should
comply with the ICJ's decision in Avena by having state courts give
effect to the ICJ's decision.256 The scope of the President's power in this
257
regard is currently being challenged in Texas courts.
2.

Legislative Compliance

While the executive branch is the primary mechanism for complying
with international tribunal judgments, Congress also plays an important
role in this process. Where an international tribunal judgment requires
the repeal or amendment of a statute or the appropriation of funds,
Congress has acted as the entity responsible for compliance. Most
prominently, Congress, rather than the executive branch or the courts, is
the only body authorized to comply with adverse WTO judgments
requiring modifications of U.S. tax and trade laws. Legislation
implementing the WTO agreements expressly prohibits any other part of
the government from acting to comply with an adverse judgment by one
of the trade dispute tribunals.25 8

254. See United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 928 (4th Cir. 1982) (enforcing a
treaty exempting consular premises from taxation by the county); United States v. City of Glen
Cove, 322 F. Supp. 149, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (enforcing a 1968 Consular Convention exemption
for property owned by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).
255. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419-20 (2003).
256. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 125, app. 2.
257. See Mark Donald, Medellin Returns: CCA Considers Bush's Memo To Override Its Own
ProceduralRules, TEX. LAW., Sept. 19, 2005, at 1.
258. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(A) (2000) (barring anyone
other than the United States from challenging U.S. or state action or inaction based on its
consistency with

the Uruguay

Round Agreements); URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT:
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For instance, since 1999, WTO dispute resolution bodies have twice
found that U.S. tax laws providing special treatment for U.S. companies
with foreign subsidiaries violate U.S. obligations under the WTO and
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) agreements.259
Congress has responded to these rulings by amending U.S. tax laws to
bring the U.S. into compliance with the WTO agreements. 260 The battle
is not over because the European Union, dissatisfied with this
amendment, has filed another claim before the WTO.26 1 Similarly,
Congress is the primary obstacle to U.S. compliance with WTO tribunal
judgments finding a provision of U.S. anti-dumping laws, the so-called
3 Although the
"Byrd Amendment," 262 in violation of WTO obligations.262aio3o
Bush Administration has stated its intentions to comply with the WTO
tribunal judgment, it cannot do so on its own. Congress is the only body
that can bring the U.S. into compliance.
The U.S. has not been subject to an international tribunal judgment
calling for the payment of funds. If such a judgment were issued,
however, Congress is almost certainly the only institution authorized to
make such a payment. The Constitution allocates the power to
appropriate funds to Congress exclusively.2 6 Indeed, Congress has made
sure that the Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction over any treatybased claim against the U.S. government.265
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R. Doc. NO. 103-316, at 675-77, 1043-44 (1994), as
reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040,4054-56,4327.
259. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign sales
Corporations"-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, paras. 256-57,
WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002); Panel Report, Unites States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign
Sales Corporations," paras. 177-80, WT/DS 108/AB, (Feb. 24, 2000), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/108abr.doc.
260. See FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-519,
§ 3(a), 114 Stat. 2423, 2423-24, repealed by American JOBS Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-357, § 101, 118 Stat. 1423, 1423-24 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 114 (West 2002 &
Supp. 2005)).
261. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, United States-Tax
Treatmentfor "ForeignSales Corporations," WT/DS 108/29 (Jan. 14, 2005).
262. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 1675c (West 1999 & Supp. 2005)).
263. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset
Act of2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 27, 2003).
264. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.").
265. 28 U.S.C. § 1502 (2000) ("Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the United
States Court of Federal Claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim against the United States
growing out of or dependent upon any treaty entered into with foreign nations.").
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3.

State Compliance

The expansion of international law in recent years to encompass areas
of law such as criminal punishment and domestic relations has exposed
state laws to greater international scrutiny.266 As Medellin and other
VCCR cases have illustrated, state and local authorities were the primary
violators of the VCCR.267 In a different vein, state tort,268
environmental, 269 and gambling regulations 270 have recently been
challenged in international trade tribunals.
Because state activities are increasingly subject to challenge by
foreign countries in international tribunals, states have also become the
front lines in bringing the U.S. back into compliance. While the
President may have the authority to sue or even order a state to comply
with an international tribunal judgment, states may also comply without
any formal federal pressure. For instance, in 2003, Brazil filed a claim in
the WTO dispute settlement body challenging a Florida scheme to tax
foreign oranges and divert funds to advertising for Florida oranges. 271
Before the dispute settlement body issued a judgment, Florida's
legislature repealed the law, citing its probable violation of WTO
obligations.272
The federal government has recognized the role of the states in
complying with international law obligations. For instance, when
attaching a federalism and non-self-execution declaration to the
266. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism,97 MICH. L. REV. 390,
402-09 (1998) (reviewing the potential conflicts between treaties and state laws).
267. All three ICJ cases against the United States involved VCCR violations by state and local
authorities, as opposed to federal officials. See, e.g., Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9).
268. See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Decision on Hearing of Respondent's Objection to
Competence and Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (Jan. 5, 2001), available at http://
naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Loewen/Loewen/20-/o2OJurisdiction/201%/o202005-01-2001.pdf.

/2OAward /20- /o

269. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Statement of Claim, ICSID (W. Bank, NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Trib., Dec. 3, 1999).
270. Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, United States-Measures Affecting the
Cross-BorderSupply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/1, S/L/l 10 (Mar. 27, 2003).
27 1. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Brazil, United States-Equalizing Excise
Tax Imposed by Florida on Processed Orange and Grapefruit Products, WT/DS250/2 (Aug. 19,
2002).
272. See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, United States-Equalizing Excise Tax
Imposed by Floridaon Processed Orange and GrapefruitProducts, WT/DS250/3, G/L/680 (June 2,
2004) (reporting that Florida had amended its statutes to comply with WTO rules).
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Senate declared
that the United State's compliance was, at least in part, the responsibility
of state and local governments.2 73 State laws, policies, and actions,
therefore, formed part of the U.S. system for complying with
international obligations.
State governments have a long history of modifying or adjusting their
laws to bring the U.S. into compliance with international law.274 State
governors have been responsible for fulfilling treaty obligations toward
foreign nationals, including the provision of consular notification and
estate law rights.275 Indeed, the expansion of international law into a
wider variety of subjects increases the likelihood that states will play an
ever more important role in ensuring compliance with international court
judgments.
4.

Judicial Compliance

Somewhat surprisingly, the institution with perhaps the smallest role
in the enforcement of international tribunal judgments is the judicial
branch. Prior to the Oklahoma court's decision in Torres, for instance,
no federal or state court in the U.S. had ever implemented an
international tribunal judgment absent a separate statutory
authorization.27 6 As I explain below, to the extent that courts have
implemented international tribunal judgments, they have done so
pursuant to specific legislative or executive authorization. As explained
above, compliance with most adverse international tribunal judgments is
the sole responsibility of the political branches or perhaps the states.
As a doctrinal matter, the main reason for the relatively small judicial
role is the doctrine of self-execution. While treaties hold the status of the

273. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. 8071 (1992) (enacted) ("That the United States
understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the
state and local governments; to the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over
such matters, the Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the
end that the competent authorities of the state or local governments may take appropriate measures
for the fulfillment of the Covenant.").
274. See Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control Compliance
with InternationalLaw, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 476-99 (2004).

275. Id. at 482-83.
276. See Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of
Deference, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 675, 696 & n.74 (2003).
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277
"law of the land" pursuant to Article VI of the U.S. Constitution,

courts will only give effect to treaties in the same manner they give
effect to federal statutes if they find the treaty to be self-executing.27 8
Unfortunately, determining whether or not a treaty is self-executing is
hardly a simple task for courts and remains a matter of substantial
confusion among scholars. 279 Adding to the confusion is the legal
distinction between an executive agreement made by the President and a
treaty made with the advice and consent of the Senate. Because the
domestic legal status of executive agreements remains somewhat
unsettled,28 0 courts generally look for statutory authorization before
implementing any judgments. For instance, courts have read statutes
implementing the
WTO agreement to mean that such judgments have no
281
domestic effect.
In many cases, statutes implementing a treaty that commits the U.S. to
a dispute resolution system provide guidance for courts on domestic
enforcement. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) implementing legislation, for instance, instructs U.S.

courts to give full faith and credit to ICSID judgments.28 2 Courts have
277. U.S. CONST. art. VI. The status of customary international law has a more problematic
textual basis. A recent Supreme Court decision strongly suggests that the power to interpret
customary international law falls within the common lawmaking power of the federal courts,
although the scope of the decision remains unclear. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
732 (2004).
278. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829). But see John C. Yoo, Globalism
and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding,99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1955, 2091-94 (1999) (arguing that the original understanding of the Constitution made
almost all treaties non-self-executing); John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and
StructuralDefense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2233-40 (1999) (arguing that
the text and structure of the Constitution support a presumption of non-self-execution).
279. For a worthy but unsuccessful attempt to clarify the self-execution doctrine, see Carlos
Manuel Vazquez, The FourDoctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 697-700
(1995).
280. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV.
801, 811 (1995) (pointing out that the text of the Constitution permits an inference that treaties are a
non-exclusive means of creating international agreements); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-FormMethod in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 1221, 1249-78 (1995) (rejecting the interchangeability of treaties and executive
agreements).
281. See, e.g., Corus Staal BV v. Dep't of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("WTO decisions are not binding on the United States, much less this court.").
282. 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a) (2000) ("An award of an arbitral tribunal rendered pursuant to chapter
IV of the [ICSID] convention shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United States. The
pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the same full
faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the
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also looked to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 2 3 as the basis for
enforcing certain international tribunal judgments. For instance, courts
have generally treated judgments of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal as
arbitration awards within the meaning of the FAA.284
On the other hand, where treaties bind the U.S. to international
dispute resolution but are unaccompanied by any implementing
legislation, courts have been very cautious. Prior to the Medellin case,
only two federal courts had considered this question. Neither came to a
definitive doctrinal conclusion as to the domestic legal effect of such
international tribunal judgments.
The first major case to consider the domestic legal effect of an
international tribunal judgment arose out of a dispute between the U.S.
and the U.N. Security Council over U.S. policy toward South Africa.285
The U.N. Security Council had imposed obligations on member states to
refrain from relations with countries recognizing South African control
of the neighboring state of Namibia.286 Plaintiffs, including U.S. citizens,
alleged that the U.S. government was violating these resolutions and
sought enforcement of the U.N. Security Council resolution in federal
district court. 87 Plaintiffs cited U.S. obligations to abide by resolutions
of the Security Council. 288 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia dismissed the complaint, holding that "even assuming there is
an international obligation that is binding on the United States-a point
we do not in any way reach on the merits-the U.N. resolution
underlying that obligation does not confer rights on the citizens of the
enforceable in court in the absence of
United States that are 289
implementing legislation.,
The treaty obligations of the U.S. to abide by judgments of the ICJ are
slightly different. Still, the D.C. Circuit used similar reasoning to
dismiss a complaint seeking enforcement of an ICJ order finding that the
290
U.S. had violated international law by mining Nicaragua's harbors.
several States.").
283. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
284. See, e.g., Ministry of Def. of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould Inc., 887 F.2d 1357,
1363-67 (9th Cir. 1989).
285. See Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.

289. Id. at 850.
290. See Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 933-34 (D.C. Cir.
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The court refused to give effect to the ICJ order on a number of grounds,
including that the provision of the U.N. Charter granting jurisdiction to
the ICJ was not self-executing. 29 In other words, while the U.N. Charter
did impose real obligations on the U.S. to accept the jurisdiction of the
ICJ, it did not impose an obligation on U.S. courts to give effect to the
ICJ order.
These precedents stand for the proposition that international tribunal
judgments should not have self-executing domestic legal effect. Courts
have avoided independently enforcing international tribunal judgments
and have often sought separate congressional authorization. This further
supports my view that enforcement of international judgments is a
foreign affairs power assigned to the political branches of the U.S.
government.
In sum, international tribunal judgments, like any other international
obligation imposed on the U.S., exist in a dualist framework. The U.S.
government may comply, but it may also choose not to. Many liberal
internationalist and transnationalist scholars have failed to grapple with
the significance of this power to refuse compliance with international
law. Accepting the existence of this power transforms an international
tribunal judgment into a question of foreign policy. As such,
enforcement requires an exercise of a general power over foreign affairs.
And that power is held by either Congress or the President, or both. It is
not held by the courts.
U.S. practice with respect to international tribunals confirms this
understanding. It places the task of bringing the U.S. into compliance
with international tribunal obligations on the political branches of the
U.S. federal and state governments. In particular, the executive branch
has played a central role both in complying with international tribunal
judgments and in overseeing and supervising the limited judicial role in
such compliance efforts.
IV. A NEW WORLD COURT ORDER AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION
This Part argues that because the source of U.S. authority to comply
with international tribunal judgments lies in the foreign affairs power,
the most serious constitutional difficulty with enforcement of

1988).
291. Id. at 935-37.
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international tribunal judgments is excessive delegation of the foreign
affairs power of the U.S. to an international tribunal. 292 First, I consider
the problems with a new world court order posed by Article III, Section
1 of the U.S. Constitution. Then I address the nondelegation doctrine and
its tension with an increased U.S. acceptance of the new world court
order.
A.

The Incompleteness of Article III Objections

The most commonly raised constitutional objection to the new world
court order is based on Article III, Section 1, which provides that "[t]he
judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish., 293 An international tribunal judgment that is
binding on U.S. courts arguably violates this provision because an
international tribunal is neither the Supreme Court nor an inferior court
established by Congress. More importantly, if an international tribunal's
judgments are binding on U.S. courts, then the international tribunal is
impermissibly exercising the "judicial Power of the United States. 294
This argument, while persuasive to some degree, is vulnerable to a
number of objections. Analogizing enforcement of international tribunal
judgments to enforcement of foreign judgments, liberal internationalist
and transnationalist scholars argue that international tribunals are not
292. One of the most common objections to granting international tribunal judgments domestic
effect is that it would amount to a "transfer" of sovereignty to international organizations. The
"sovereignty" argument is usually invoked by critics of international organizations. For instance,
critics of the Law of the Sea Treaty have argued that joining the treaty would amount to a transfer of
sovereignty to the United Nations Law of the Sea bureaucracy. The most sophisticated version of
this argument is presented by Professor Jeremy Rabkin. In a series of books, he has argued tirelessly
against greater or deeper engagement with international organizations. His main argument is that, as
a matter of political theory, the U.S. and other constitutional democracies cannot remain faithful to
their liberal democratic commitments while at the same time transferring more and more authority
to international organizations. See, e.g., JEREMY RABKIN, THE CASE FOR SOVEREIGNTY 68-70
(2004); JEREMY RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? 44-51 (2005). While compelling, the
sovereignty argument is not grounded in any particular doctrine of constitutional law. No court or
scholar has suggested that the concept of sovereignty, standing alone, represents a legal limitation
on U.S. participation in various international organizations. In other words, while sovereignty is a
compelling political challenge, it does not provide a useful legal framework for analyzing or
evaluating U.S. relationships with international organizations or tribunals. See, e.g., William Satire,
Op-Ed., Beware Entangling Treaties Kyoto is Just One Example: America Should Refuse to Sign
Away Sovereignty to InternationalBodies, PITT. POST GAZ., Apr. 10, 2001, at A19 (arguing against
U.S. participation in new international institutions).
293. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1, cl. 2.
294. Id. el. I.
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exercising federal judicial power pursuant to Article III. As Professor
Louis Henkin explains, "[t]here would seem to be no compelling
constitutional reasons why the relations between the United States and
its citizens could not be subject to both the laws and courts of the United
States and to the international law administered by international
tribunals exercising international judicial power., 295 In other words, as
long as international tribunals limit their exercise of judicial power to
U.S. international obligations as opposed to U.S. domestic laws, there is
no Article III problem raised by U.S. participation in international
tribunals. Otherwise, anytime a federal court enforced a foreign
judgment, it would also run into an Article III problem. Further, as
Professor Martinez has recently argued, courts could avoid the Article
III problem simply by enforcing international tribunal judgments as a
matter Of comity.296 As long as Article III courts are not bound to
to apply
enforce an international tribunal judgment, the final authority
2 97
the judicial power of the U.S. remains with Article III CoUrtS.
B.

The Nondelegation Objection

Even if domestic judicial enforcement of international tribunal
judgments does not violate Article III, it might come into conflict with
the Constitution in some other way. When a court in the U.S. agrees to
follow an international tribunal's determination of U.S. obligations
under international law, the court has made a foreign policy
determination that the U.S. will comply with the tribunal. If the court
treats the international tribunal's determination as binding, it will have
recognized a delegation of that foreign policy determination to the
international tribunal 298 This constitutes an "international delegation" of
the foreign affairs power of the U.S.
Under existing Supreme Court doctrine, the nondelegation doctrine
operates as a general separation of powers requirement seeking to
prevent any branch of the government from transferring excessive
authority to any other branch. 299 The classic example of delegation is
295. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 267 (2d ed.
1996).
296. Martinez, supra note 12, at 502.
297. Id.
298. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to InternationalOrganizations:
New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REv. 71, 83-87 (2000).
299. Id. at 89-93.
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when Congress transfers or delegates legislative authority to the
executive branch and its administrative agencies. 300 Delegations may
also occur when Congress attempts to transfer the power of the other
branches. 30 1 For instance, Congress' creation of an independent counsel
not subject to executive oversight was challenged as a violation of the
Appointments Clause.30 2 But the Appointments Clause is a textual
limitation on the impermissible delegation of executive power to the
legislative branch.30 3 Similarly, courts have wielded Article III to
prevent Congress from transferring the federal judicial power away from
the federal courts.3 °4
Not all international delegations are constitutionally impermissible.
However, no advocates of the new world court order have grappled
directly with the importance of delegation as a constitutional constraint
on the powers of such tribunals and on domestic courts following such
tribunals. The difference between U.S. obligations under international
law and the consequence of those obligations in domestic U.S. law
illustrates why they should. When an international tribunal imposes an
obligation on the U.S. under international law, it is not exercising any
delegated power of the U.S. government. But when that international
obligation becomes an enforceable legal obligation under U.S. domestic
law and in U.S. courts, then the international tribunal's action becomes
some exercise of the U.S. government's constitutional powers to make,
interpret, and implement an international law obligation of the U.S.
As explained in Part III, the U.S. government's political branches
have generally reserved for themselves the power to make, interpret, and
implement international obligations as a matter of domestic law. Courts
have widely deferred to the executive branch's interpretation of treaties
and customary international law.30 5 They have refused to enforce treaty
obligations, even when petitioned directly by foreign governments, if
Congress has overruled that treaty obligation by statute or if they believe

300. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
301. See Ku, supra note 298, at 91-92.
302. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659-60 (1988).

303. Id. at 673-77.
304. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982).
305. See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) ("Although

not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged
with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight."); F.W. Stone Eng'g Co. v.
Petroleos Mexicanos of Mexico, D.E, 42 A.2d 57, 59-60 (Pa. 1945) (giving complete deference to
the State Department's determination of the applicability of the law of foreign sovereign immunity).
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the treaty was not meant to be self-executing.30 6 Indeed, the whole
doctrine of non-self-execution is based on the assumption that many
treaty obligations can only be enforced by either the executive or
legislative branch.30 7
This -allocation of domestic constitutional powers has a plain
functional imperative, as I discuss in the next Part. Here, it is enough to
point out that judicial enforcement of international tribunal judgments
represents a shift of authority from the executive and legislative
branches to the international tribunal. In other words, it represents a
"delegation" of the power to implement international obligations away
from the political branches of the federal government to the international
tribunal. Rather than follow the President or Congress on how and
whether to enforce an international law obligation, the new world court
order instructs U.S. courts to independently decide whether and how to
follow the international tribunal.
In sum, delegation is useful as an analytical framework because it
shifts the analysis away from the comparatively narrow question of
whether an international tribunal is exercising the "judicial Power of the
United States." Instead, it requires courts to conduct a broad separation
of powers analysis to assess whether the international tribunal is
exercising some aspect of the U.S. government's broad power to make
and interpret international agreements. If, as internationalist and
transnationalist supporters of the new world court order have argued,
international tribunals are merely interpreting and adjudicating the
international obligations of the U.S., the delegation analysis reminds us
that even this power is subject to some constitutional limitations.
V.

INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS

In this Part, I flesh out and defend the application of the
nondelegation doctrine to international tribunal judgments. I argue that
the much-criticized nondelegation doctrine still has applicability to
international delegations. In particular, the doctrine can survive as a
clear statement rule requiring courts to adopt interpretations that avoid
delegations to international tribunals. I also offer functional justifications
306. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robinson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784,
785 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799), affid on othergrounds, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862).
307. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829) (noting that in some cases, a
treaty "addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute
the contract, before it can become a rule for the court").
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for adopting such an approach.
A.

Nondelegation:A Doctrine that Won't Die

The U.S. Supreme Court has rarely relied on the nondelegation
doctrine over the past seventy years.30 8 Although the Supreme Court has
never rejected the doctrine, it has consistently refused to strike down
delegations when applying the doctrine. Most recently, it refused to
affirm a lower court's determination that a provision of the Clean Air
Act constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the
Environmental Protection Agency.30 9
The doctrine has become so underused that leading scholars have
recently tried to bury it. Professors Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule
have argued, for instance, that there is no such thing as a delegation of
legislative power. 310 Rather, all so-called delegations are themselves
exercises of legislative31 1power that satisfy the requirements of Article I of
the U.S. Constitution.
Such analyses have been criticized for misconstruing the text of the
Constitution and for failing to adequately address the functional
necessity of a nondelegation doctrine.31 2 For my purposes, the functional
response is more relevant. After all, even if Professors Posner and
Vermeule are correct as a formal textual matter, their analysis does not
answer the functional problem that the nondelegation doctrine is
designed to guard against. Without a nondelegation constraint, Congress
could undercut the basic system of separation of powers by arrogating
many constitutional powers within a single branch. Moreover, Congress
and other institutions,
can shift responsibility for policies to agencies
31 3
thus undercutting its political accountability.
308. The Supreme Court has not found a violation of the nondelegation doctrine since 1935. See
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935) (finding an
impermissible delegation by Congress).
309. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001).
310. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 16.
311. Id. at 1723.
312. See. e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's
Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1297, 1305-10 (2003) (offering an alternative
textual understanding of the Constitution that requires a nondelegation doctrine). Contra Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331 (2003)
(responding to critics).
313. For a spirited and lengthy discussion of the relationship between political accountability and
delegation, see DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES
THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
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Replacing the nondelegation doctrine with an "exclusive" delegation
requirement does not resolve the criticism of failing to deal with
functional problems. Professor Thomas Merrill suggests that an
exclusive delegation doctrine would require courts to trace all such
legislative delegations to an exercise of Congress' authority under
Article I.3 14 In this view, Congress's delegations would be policed by
requiring Congress to identify a source in Article I for its delegation.
Professor Merrill hopes that imposing this requirement would enhance
the accountability of Congress for legislative actions.3 15 Moreover, as
other scholars have pointed out, Congress still retains substantial control
over administrative
agencies through budgetary oversight and reporting
31 6
requirements.
International delegations raise at least the same, if not greater,
functional concerns as excessive domestic delegations. While Professor
Merrill's solution might alleviate concerns about political accountability
and legitimacy in the domestic context, it is less helpful in the
international context. As I have argued elsewhere, international
delegations pose a different separation of powers challenge to the federal
government. 317 Unlike delegations within the federal government, or to
the states or private organizations, international delegations are made to
international organizations largely independent of other mechanisms of
federal control. There is some evidence that U.S. policymakers have
recognized the real possibility of an international delegation by attaching
signing statements and proposing non-self-executing delegations to
3 18
legislation involving international tribunals.
B.

Nondelegation as a Super-Strong ClearStatement Rule

Although the nondelegation doctrine is rarely invoked, it can still
have serious and significant doctrinal consequences for international
tribunal judgments as a matter of treaty interpretation. Although the
nondelegation doctrine has been dormant as a matter of judicial

314. Thomas Merrill,

Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive

Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2150-51 (2004).
315. Id. at 2142.
316. See, e.g., David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the
Separation of Powers:A PoliticalScience Approach, 20 CARDOzo L. REV. 947, 956-58 (1999).
317. See Ku, supra note 298, at 88-113.
318. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Clean Diamond Trade Act, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 491 (Apr. 25, 2003).
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application, a number of scholars have argued that the nondelegation
doctrine has substantial doctrinal importance as a canon of statutory
construction.319
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has applied a number of
"super-strong clear statement" rules in the interpretation of federal
statutes. 320 The Court has used these super-strong clear statement rules to
interpret statutes to avoid constitutional difficulties. 321 Federal courts
have used the super-strong clear statement rules to avoid constitutional
difficulties with doctrines such as the nondelegation doctrine, even
though such doctrines are rarely if ever directly enforced.3 22 In other
words, a court is more likely to interpret a statute to avoid a violation of
the nondelegation doctrine rather than find that statute in violation of
that doctrine. By invoking the super-strong clear statement rules as a
method of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court has revived and
invigorated constitutional doctrines long believed to be defunct.
Members of the Court, for instance, have cited avoidance of the
nondelegation doctrine as the basis for rejecting an agency's
323
interpretation of a statute.
The normative desirability of using such interpretive mechanisms
remains questionable. 4 I defend the use of such rules on normative and
functional grounds. 32' For my purposes, it is enough that courts need not
directly apply the traditionally underenforced nondelegation doctrine to
limit the delegation of the legislative or the treaty-making power.
Courts might apply the nondelegation doctrine, as Professor Curtis
Bradley has suggested, to interpret delegations to international tribunals

319. See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon ofAvoidance, 2000 SUP. CT.
REv. 223, 223 (2000) ("The nondelegation doctrine, in other words, now operates exclusively
through the interpretive canon requiring avoidance of serious constitutional questions."); Cass R.
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 330-37 (discussing how courts use
nondelegation canons to impose constraints on administrative power).
320. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 21, at 597.
321. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (citing the danger of
First Amendment infringement as a basis for the narrow interpretation of a labor statute); Eskridge
& Frickey, supra note 21, at 599-600 (discussing the Supreme Court's invocation of the doctrine to
avoid constitutional difficulties).
322. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 21, at 606-07 (discussing the interpretive use of the

nondelegation doctrine).
323. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-88 (1980)

(plurality opinion) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
324. See Eskridge & Frickey, supranote 21, at 640-45.

325. See infra Part V.D.
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as non-self-executing.326 Absent a super-strong clear statement from the
treaty-makers that a delegation of foreign affairs power is self-executing,
a U.S. court should interpret all such delegations as non-self32
In this way, the nondelegation doctrine creates a
executing. 327
presumption of non-self-execution when courts consider international
tribunal judgments.32 8
By requiring courts to first identify a super-strong clear statement
from the political branches, a super-strong clear statement rule would
make it more difficult, although not impossible, for international
tribunals to "penetrate" the state to "network" or "dialogue" with
domestic courts.329 Under this approach, such penetration could still
occur, but only after explicit and clear authorization from the political
branches responsible for the administration of foreign policy.
Authorization could occur in the form of implementing legislation from
Congress or in the language of the treaty itself. In effect, a presumption
of non-self-execution reverses the approach recommended by liberal
internationalists and transnationalists.
C.

Application of the NondelegationDoctrine

How might a nondelegation canon of treaty interpretation work in the
international context? In this Section I apply my proposed approach in
two situations. First, I examine how the nondelegation doctrine would
affect a court faced with a treaty that is silent on the question of
domestic judicial enforcement. Second, I consider how that doctrine
would be applied where a treaty's language plainly requires domestic
judicial enforcement.
1.

The OptionalProtocolto the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations

The Optional Protocol to the VCCR grants the ICJ jurisdiction over
the U.S.3 30 The Optional Protocol is the sole basis of the ICJ's
jurisdiction because the U.S. has withdrawn its acceptance of the ICJ's

326. Bradley, supra note 23, at 1587-95.
327. See id.
328. Id. at 1587.
329. See supra Part 1I.B.4.
330. VCCR, supranote 29, Optional Protocol, art. 1.
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general compulsory jurisdiction. 33' Article I of the Optional Protocol
reads in full: "Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of
the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the
Court by an application
made by any party to the dispute being a Party to
3 32
the present Protocol.9
While nothing in the language of article I of the Optional Protocol
touches on the self-executing nature of the ICJ's judgments pursuant to
the Protocol, supporters of the new world court order might focus on the
phrase "within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice. 333 Acceptance of such language, as Justice Breyer noted, might
make the ICJ the authoritative interpreter of the VCCR for the U.S. 3 34 As
such, domestic courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, would be
required to follow the ICJ's interpretation. In my view, the Optional
Protocol does not provide a sufficiently clear statement of its selfexecuting status to satisfy concerns about excessive delegation to the
ICJ. The question for the Court in Medellin and Torres was whether the
Optional Protocol's allocation of jurisdiction to the ICJ also required
domestic courts to follow the ICJ's judgments. 335 The self-execution of
the ICJ's judgments depends not on whether the VCCR is selfexecuting, but on whether the Optional Protocol is self-executing. The
Optional Protocol does not contain a super-strong clear statement that
the U.S. delegated to the ICJ the authority to issue self-executing
judgments.
It is worth recalling that when previous courts considered other grants
of compulsory jurisdiction to the ICJ, they did not find such language to
be self-executing.3 36 In Committee of United States Citizens Living in
Nicaraguav. Reagan,337 the D.C. Circuit held that neither the ICJ Statute
nor language in the United Nations Charter where the U.S. "undert[ook]
331. United States: Department of State Letter and Statement Concerning Termination of

Acceptance ofL C.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction, 24 I.L.M. 1742, 1742-43 (1985) (withdrawing from
ICJ's jurisdiction in the case involving Nicaragua); see also LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001
I.C.J. 466, 480 (June 27).
332. VCCR, supra note 29, Optional Protocol, art. I.
333. Id.
334. Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1037-41 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
335. Medellin III, _ U.S_ (May 23, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2089 (2005) (per curiam); Torres
v. Oklahoma, No. D-1996-350 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 2004).
336. See supra Part IIl.B.2.
337. 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any
case to which it is a party" gave private individuals the right to enforce
the treaty in U.S. federal court.3 38 Moreover, the language of the
provision also suggests that only parties to the VCCR and the Protocol
can make an application to the ICJ. 3 39 Only states can be parties to the
ICJ, which suggests that individuals like Medellin and Torres are not
intended to be able to directly enforce the Optional Protocol.
The travaux pr~paratoiresto both the VCCR and Optional Protocol
do not clarify matters. They do not appear to discuss the mechanisms of
domestic enforcement. In the case of other international tribunals that
have been delegated power pursuant to a treaty, the U.S. has specified
standards for its courts to follow before enforcing international tribunal
judgments, especially judgments that purport to place binding
obligations on the U.S. government. For instance, while U.S. courts are
instructed to give "full faith and credit" to judgments of the ICSID, U.S.
courts are given specific standards when enforcing judgments made
pursuant to the New York Convention for the Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards.3 40
Yet in this instance, courts would have to read the Optional Protocol
as granting similar authority without any such standards. Such a
standardless delegation to an international institution is a classic case for
the nondelegation doctrine. But, under my proposal, a court could avoid
the tricky application of the nondelegation doctrine by simply
interpreting the Optional Protocol as non-self-executing. By doing so, a
court would avoid the difficult constitutional analysis that the
nondelegation doctrine requires.
Under my approach, ICJ judgments interpreting the VCCR would not
have self-executing status as a matter of domestic law because the
Optional Protocol does not contain a super-strong clear statement to that
effect. In such a case, the U.S. government's political branches and
constituent state government executives and legislatures could enact
legislation or issue executive orders to bring the U.S. into compliance
with the alleged VCCR violations. In fact, with respect to the ICJ's
Avena decision, the political branches have already acted to implement
that judgment pursuant to state court proceedings.34 1

338. Id. at 937-38 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 94).
339. Id.
340. See Alford, supra note 276, at 690-93, 700-04.
341. See supra Part I.B.3.c.
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The Law of the Sea Treaty

Could any treaty satisfy the super-strong clear statement requirement?
The Law of the Sea Treaty, currently under consideration by the U.S.
Senate,342 provides such a clear statement provision. As I will explain,
the reaction of the political branches to this provision reveals the
benefits of requiring super-strong clear statement rules before granting
international tribunal judgments self-executing status.
The Law of the Sea Treaty provides a comprehensive set of
regulations for all matters pertaining to the world's oceans.343 In addition
to providing a comprehensive legal framework for navigation of the seas
and the recognition of territorial waters, 344 the Law of the Sea Treaty
also provides rules for the development of undersea resources, especially
oil and minerals located in deep ocean seabeds and on the continental
shelf.345 The Law of the Sea Treaty also establishes institutions for the
administration of these rules. Perhaps the most controversial institution,
at least in the U.S., is the creation of a Seabed Authority authorized to
levy fees on individuals seeking rights to develop undersea resources not
located within the territory of any particular nation.346
The Law of the Sea Treaty establishes a complex network of
international tribunals. Parties to the treaty may choose between special
arbitral tribunals, the ICJ, and the newly constituted International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to resolve disputes under the
treaty. 347 Although the treaty gives parties broad discretion to choose
dispute resolution mechanisms for most issues, parties must submit to
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber for
any disputes relating to the seabed provisions of the treaty.3 48 Not only
does the ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber have compulsory jurisdiction
over any dispute between parties relating to the seabed, but the
enforceability of its judgments is spelled out in the treaty: "decisions of

342. See Press Release, Sen. Richard G. Lugar, Foreign Relations Committee Advances Law of

the Seas [sic] Treaty (Feb. 25, 2004), http://lugar.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=218386.
343. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 24.

344. Message from the President of the United States Submitting the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, at vi, July 29, 1994, S. TREATY DOc. No. 103-39, available at 1992 WL
725374.
345. Id.
346. UNCLOS, supra note 24, arts. 156-58.
347. Id. arts. 186, 188.
348. Id. art. 188.b.
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the [Seabed Disputes] Chamber shall be enforceable in the territories of
the States Parties in the same manner as judgments or orders of the
highest court of the State Party in whose territory the enforcement is
sought., 349 Thus, unlike the Optional Protocol's vague reference to
"compulsory jurisdiction," article 39 explicitly discusses the question of
domestic enforcement. The plain language of article 39 requires U.S.
courts to treat Seabed Disputes Chamber decisions in the same way that
they would treat judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court.
The language in this provision qualifies as a super-strong clear
statement requiring domestic judicial enforcement of Seabed Disputes
Chamber judgments. Indeed, as the State Department notes, it is such a
clear statement that it creates constitutional concerns.35 ° The State
Department has recommended that the Senate attach a declaration to the
Law of the Sea Treaty identifying this provision of the treaty as "nonself-executing." The Law of the Sea Treaty, however, states that no
reservations to its requirements are permitted. 35 1 Given the clarity of this
language, it is unclear how the Senate could override the treaty's
requirements of domestic judicial enforcement by attaching a reservation
that is also in violation of the treaty's obligations.
In any case, although the nondelegation doctrine would not be
invoked here, its existence as a canon of treaty interpretation still
matters. The very clarity of the Law of the Sea Treaty's provisions
spurred substantial efforts by the political branches to limit or prevent
judicial enforcement that they believe could cause constitutional
difficulties. By imposing a clear statement rule, courts can help to ensure
that the political branches have the opportunity to "constitutionalize"
such provisions.
D.

FunctionalJustificationsfor Applying a Nondelegation Doctrine to
InternationalTribunal Judgments

Even as a super-strong clear statement rule, courts may be reluctant to
invoke the long-dormant nondelegation doctrine against international
tribunals. Certainly, the lack of recent judicial usage of the doctrine and
its subjection to severe academic criticism make it a relatively
349. Id. annex VI, art. 39.
350. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA,
SEN. EXEC. REP. 108-10, at 13-15 (2004).

351. UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 309 ("No reservations or exceptions may be made to this
Convention unless expressly permitted by other articles of this Convention.").
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unattractive option for judges. For this reason, I offer three functional
justifications for applying the nondelegation doctrine to international
delegations: (1) to force political accountability; (2) to bolster the
political legitimacy of international adjudication; and (3) to ensure that
the institutions with greater expertise in foreign affairs remain in control
of compliance with international obligations.
1.

A Super-StrongClear Statement Rule ForcesPolitical
Accountability

A super-strong clear statement requirement for judicial enforcement
of international tribunal judgments enforces political accountability. It
shifts the decision of how and whether to comply with a tribunal's
judgment to the political branches.352 This does not mean that the U.S.
will always defy that tribunal's judgments.
As explained in Part 111, both the executive and legislative branches
have ample means to ensure compliance with international tribunal
judgments. Indeed, the President's intervention in the Medellin case is a
classic example of how the executive branch can take responsibility for
compliance with an international tribunal judgment. Even if the U.S.
Supreme Court does not intervene, the President appears to have the
authority to force compliance with an ICJ judgment.
Forcing the political branches to clarify their intentions about judicial
enforcement prevents them from avoiding responsibility for the
consequences of an international tribunal's judgment. In many if not
most instances, the political branches will act to limit the independent
judicial role in the enforcement of international obligations, as they have
done in the proposed conditions for ratification of the Law of the Sea
Treaty. If they do not take steps to limit such a rule, the fact that the
enforcement provision is a clear statement prevents future claims that an
activist domestic or international court is wrongly interpreting such a
provision.

352. As Nicholas Rosenkranz has observed, the use of a clear statement rule as an interpretive
rule operates in a similar manner to default rules in the private law context. See Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REv. 2085, 2122-23 (2002).
Legal scholars like Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner have noted that certain doctrines of contract law
act as default rules forcing the parties to reveal information to each other in order to reach the fairest
and most efficient outcome. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87,91 (1989).
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2.

A Super-Strong ClearStatement Rule Creates PoliticalLegitimacy

Political legitimacy is another related justification for the clear
statement rule. By taking courts out of the enforcement process absent
the clearest statement by a political branch, the political legitimacy of
international tribunal judgments becomes enhanced. Why? Because
rather than relying on domestic courts to enforce their judgments,
international tribunals will have the imprimatur of Congress or the
President for their judgments.
Courts in the U.S. play a central role in the U.S. constitutional system.
But their unique status is highly dependent on limits to their role. In
particular, scholars have debated for decades the courts' countermajoritarian or non-democratic difficulty when they wield constitutional
law to overturn decisions made by Congress or the President. 3 The
counter-majoritarian concern is alleviated by the courts' reliance on the
Constitution as the basis for its determinations.
A similar although less serious counter-majoritarian difficulty arises
when a court is faced with the enforcement of an international tribunal
judgment. In such cases, the U.S. has suffered an adverse judgment
before an international tribunal. A domestic court giving effect to that
judgment could very easily clash with the executive or legislative
branches that had been contesting, and might continue to contest, the
validity of the international judgment.
By relying on the political branches to bring the U.S. into compliance
with international obligations, courts ensure that the political branches
have made the determination to comply with the international tribunal
judgment. As I have argued, almost all compliance with international
tribunal judgments has been carried out by the executive and legislative
branches. 354 In doing so, any question of counter-majoritarian difficulties
are resolved and the political legitimacy of any such compliance is
unquestionable.
The importance of political legitimacy also explains why an
international delegation cannot be understood merely as a useful reallocation and division of authority akin to domestic federalism.
Professor Edward Swaine has argued that international delegations could
be justified in the same way that U.S. federalism can be justified: as a
353. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History
of the CounternajoritarianDifficulty, PartFive, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 201-02 (2002).
354. See supra Part III.B.1-2.
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separation of powers that sets different levels of governmental authority
as a check against each other.355 This is an attractive concept, but it does
not fully grapple with the weaker political legitimacy, to say nothing of
political accountability, of international tribunals and institutions. Rather
than force national and local authorities to enhance social welfare,
delegations to international tribunals are just as likely to open the door to
unseemly political backlash against such institutions and concomitant
disruptions in both foreign and domestic relations.
3.

A Super-Strong Clear Statement Rule PreservesExecutive and
Legislative Expertise Over ForeignAffairs

Finally, a super-strong clear statement rule shifts the decision on
compliance with an international tribunal judgment to the institutions of
the government with the greatest expertise in foreign affairs: the
executive and legislative branches. International tribunal judgments do
not always represent simple determinations of legal obligations. They
often take place amidst a complex bilateral or multilateral relationship.
For instance, at the time Mexico was suing the U.S. in the ICJ, the U.S.
was attempting to win Mexico's vote to support the U.N. Security
Council Resolution to invade Iraq. 6 Less dramatically, U.S. compliance
with decisions of trade tribunals is often done as part of a complex
multi-level trade relationship. Attempts by the U.S. to comply with
WTO requirements by altering U.S. tax laws, for instance, were finely
tuned political efforts to modify the laws in a way least disadvantageous
to U.S. corporations.
To complicate matters further, only some countries grant international
tribunal judgments self-executing effect in their domestic courts. For
instance, most, if not all, countries that are party to the Statute of the ICJ
do not grant the ICJ's judgments self-executing effect in their domestic
courts. 357 Without a super-strong clear statement rule, the several states,

U.S. government officials, and possibly the U.S. government itself could
be subject to lawsuits in their own courts by private parties and foreign

355. Edward T. Swaine, The ConstitutionalityofInternationalDelegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1492, 1586 (2004).
356. See Andres Oppenheimer, Bush Putting Mexican President on Hold, MIAMI HERALD, Mar.
27, 2003, at 18A (describing Mexico's eleventh-hour decision to oppose a U.N. Resolution
authorizing the use of force in Iraq).
357. See Brief for Professors of International Law, Federal Jurisdiction and the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, supranote 123, at 23-24.
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governments seeking to directly enforce an international tribunal
judgment. Thus, a foreign government could ask a U.S. court to enforce
an international tribunal judgment-even though the U.S. government
has rejected enforcing that judgment as a matter of domestic law. A
court would have to determine whether and how to enforce judgments
absent reciprocity.
All of this suggests that courts are the institution least competent in
determining how or whether to comply with an international tribunal's
judgment. A court is, by design, not privy to the broader information
about the U.S. relationship with other countries or particular
international tribunals. Nor does it have any expertise in assessing that
relationship and the proper way to deal with other countries or with
international institutions.3 58 In some instances, courts will be asked to
play that role, despite their functional shortcomings. But a clear
statement requirement ensures that the political branches have made the
proper deliberations about what kind of international adjudicatory
regime is best suited for judicial enforcement.
CONCLUSION
At first glance, it seems perfectly logical and sensible to permit U.S.
courts to independently determine enforcement of international tribunal
judgments. International tribunals are an increasingly important part of
modem international relations and, as many scholars have pointed out,
domestic enforcement of international tribunal judgments could be a
major contribution to the development of a global rule of law, or at least
a global network of governance. The reasonableness of this new world
court order was reflected in the briefing and argument before the
Supreme Court in Medellin. Yet the Court's decision to avoid resolving
this issue in favor of deference to President Bush's intervention may
ultimately prove the wisest move. As I have argued, the executive and
legislative branches are the institutions constitutionally authorized to
determine whether or how to comply with an international tribunal
judgment.
Indeed, the constitutional objections to the new world court order are
far more serious than its proponents have admitted. Any attempt to
358. For a more detailed comparative analysis of the executive and judicial branches' ability to
make foreign policy determinations, see Julian G. Ku & John C. Yoo, Beyond Formalism in
Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REv. 153, 181-99
(2004).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:1, 2006

directly enforce an international tribunal judgment would have to be
based on a delegation of the foreign affairs power from the U.S. to
international tribunals. For this reason, such a delegation would have to
satisfy constitutional standards spelled out in the nondelegation doctrine.
I suggest the most likely manifestation of the nondelegation doctrine
should be as a rule of treaty interpretation requiring courts to seek a
super-strong clear statement before giving international tribunal
judgments self-executing effect. The application of this rule would be
salutary for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it would shift the
responsibility for compliance with international tribunals to the
institutions most accountable to the public. Second, it would boost the
political legitimacy of these international institutions because political
branch enforcement would require action by the entities that have the
greatest political and constitutional legitimacy in the U.S. system for this
action. Finally, this rule would permit those institutions with the greatest
knowledge of and expertise in foreign affairs to control the level of
compliance with international tribunal judgments.
The U.S. must ensure that the mechanisms for complying with
international tribunal judgments are both constitutionally authorized and
functionally adequate. The need increases as the U.S becomes more
deeply embedded within systems of international adjudication. Sharply
limiting the independent role of U.S. courts in the enforcement of
international tribunal judgments may disrupt aspirations for a new world
court order, but it is more likely to benefit both the constitutional system
and the effectiveness of internationa! adjudication in the long run.

